CULEBRA BESIEGED **ROBERT SWANN**

THE NATION

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Army Blues

Diagnosis and Suggested Treatment for a Bureaucracy Adrift from its Traditions, Unsure of its Role, Apprehensive as to its Future, and Defensive about its Past.

EDWARD F. SHERMAN

●

Government Under Fire

THE DEMANDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS II

Herbert J. Gans

Culture Strikes Back

Burton Bendow on John Simon's Film Criticism

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LETTERS

erased provocations

New York City

DEAR SIRS: In my article "Opening to the East" [*The Nation*, Feb. 1] I mentioned the irritating former-territory inscriptions of West Berlin's exhibition hall, which I saw on my last visit. I have been reliably informed that these inscriptions were removed last March as a good-will gesture on behalf of the West Berlin city government—if not at the suggestion, then with the approval of the federal cabinet in Bonn. Thus one vestige of a painful past has disappeared.

Paul Wohl

what was not said

New York City

DEAR SIRS: An article by Charles Gillespie ["Jacksonville TV: The Dynamite in Pollution," *The Nation*, Nov. 9, 1970] contained the following quotation concerning a meeting between myself and Mr. Charles Thompson, who is the main subject of that article:

> Thompson was told he "was a lucky young man to still be alive," and ITT Rayonier dispatched Jerome D. Gregoire, manager of employee and public relations services, from its New York offices "to make arrangements." Thompson says that he is not certain what arrangements Gregoire had in mind but was told, "If you leave the station before things get too rough you might give us a call."

The quotations attributed to me are completely false. . . . The true facts are that I had been advised of reports that personnel of WJXT had received threatening telephone calls following an unfavorable news report concerning my company's waste control problems at our Fernandina Beach mill, and that the calls had been attributed to company employees.

With one of my associates, William J. McHale, I went to Fernandina to make sure that everything possible that could be done was done to advise employees that such calls and similar activities were improper, that they were contrary to company policy, that any similar conduct would impair the company's ability to work out its problems effectively.

While in Fernandina, Mr. McHale and I decided to call upon the newspapers and television stations in Jacksonville. . . . Television station WJXT was among the stations we visited, and at that point I had never heard of Charles Thompson. We called on Bill Groves, the station's news editor, who introduced us to several members of the news staff. Charles Thompson was not among them. As we were leaving the station, Mr. Thompson approached us and invited us into his office, where he proceeded to discuss problems he had had in obtaining news from company officials. He also told us that he had received a number of abusive and threatening telephone calls from people in the Fernandina Beach community as a result of his reporting on our waste control problems. He said that a number of the calls had come from ITT Rayonier employees, and he asked whether the company was behind this activity.

We assured him the company deplored this type of activity and that it definitely had had no part in it. We also told Mr. Thompson that although the company had no way of controlling what its employees as individuals might do, we were making every effort to caution employees against such activity and to make sure that it did not recur.

At no time during the conversation were any threats or bribes made or implied. I did not say that Mr. Thompson was a "lucky young man to be alive," nor did I say anything which could be reasonably construed as containing that inference. Furthermore, I was not "dispatched from the company's New York office" to make any "arrangements," and I made no such statement to Mr. Thompson.

(*Continued on page 277*)

EDITORIALS

The Question

In the course of a significant colloquy on the invasion of Laos (*Congressional Record*, February 4, P. H-455 *et seq*), Rep. John Conyers (D., Mich.) raised a question that has been too long avoided. "Why do we stay in a war which everyone agrees we should not have gone into, which everyone says we ought to terminate? Why do we stay? . . . If we are against the war, why aren't we getting out?"

Not "everyone" of course wants to get out; nevertheless Rep. Don Edwards (D., Calif.) stated correctly, during the same discussion, that "there is a consensus in America today that the war was a mistake and that we must get out as soon as possible." The most recent Gallup poll reveals that 73 per cent of the public now favors a withdrawal of U.S. forces by December 31, 1971, at the latest—a sharp increase in such sentiment since September. Yet the war continues and the longer it drags on the more insistent Mr. Conyers' question becomes. It is said that the public is overwhelmed by a sense of futility; that it is apathetic; that Nixon has "won the battle of public opinion" (James Reston). But such defeatist explanations are not entirely convincing. Despite massive public relations campaigns, artful deceptions practiced at the highest levels, news blackouts designed to hoodwink the public, not the enemy, and what Rep. Abner Mikva calls "a brown-out of dialogue" about the war, the public's opposition has increased, not abated. It is of course true that Vietnamization has quieted, if it has not reduced, the volume of opposition. And one reason is that neither the press nor the political opposition has done much to clarify the meaning of Vietnamization, which is essentially "a cosmeticizing of the war" (Rep. William Ryan), "a cynical sham" (Mr. Mikva). Only rarely does one find a columnist writing as Don Oberdorfer did in *The Washington Post* of February 11: "The President appears to believe that the United States can win the war or, if you prefer, can avoid losing it. When he speaks of 'peace,' he does not mean the same thing the critics of the war mean. He means a non-Communist South Vietnamese regime reasonably secure against enemies too weak or too scared to mount effective challenge. He means by 'peace' what other people think of as 'victory.' " But even with the paucity of such clarifying comment, it is by no means clear that the public believes everything the Administration has had to say about its plan for getting us out of the war. Such confidence was not reflected in the November elections.

No, the truth is that "blame it on the public" is, as usual, a cover-up for the excessive caution of politicians. For twenty-five years politicians of both parties have sought and received shelter in a phony bipartisan consensus to the effect that the prime aim of American policy was to "contain communism." Acquiescence in this assumption absolved them of the necessity, and the duty, to debate foreign policy in partisan terms which, in the last analysis, is the best practical means of fixing responsibility for particular policies. In the colloquy in the House on February 4, Rep. John Dow (D., N.Y.) pointed out

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that the pursuit of containment policies in Vietnam has not injured Russia or China, but has gravely injured the United States. "The damage," he said, "is not just in Vietnam. It is a breakdown throughout our country, in many areas and many levels of society." Yet the leaders of both parties remain reluctant to acknowledge the failure of a policy for which the two major parties are equally responsible. Currently most of them prefer "to wait and see what happens"; in the meantime they are mounting no sharp challenge to the President's plan. The result is that popular opposition cannot find a political point around which it can rally. This opposition is much broader than support for any particular candidate in 1972; besides, the question is what to do now, not then.

So we are left with the proposition, as stated by Mr. Conyers, that there does not exist "on either side of the aisle leadership that . . . really wants to take the steps to end the war. . . . The fact still remains that we do not have people in the legislative branch . . . who are sufficiently concerned." Concerned they are, but not sufficiently concerned to stick their necks out—even though 73 per cent of the public supports withdrawal of all U.S. forces by a fixed date. Not sufficiently concerned because our aggression in Vietnam is against so-called "Communists," who happen also to have dark skins. Not sufficiently concerned because they find it difficult to explain to their constituents that President Nixon is escalating the war while reducing the role in it of U.S. combat troops.

Actually, support for Vietnamization is, as Mr. Mikva notes, "a reprehensible shirking of responsibility we should bear for bringing peace to a terribly torn subcontinent." In brief, the public has not failed the political system, it is the system that has failed the public. As Mr. Conyers points out: "I think something is going on in this country that is far more profound than most of our Members are ready to recognize, much less acknowledge; and that is that the war in Vietnam is having a devastating psychological effect upon the American public. They are losing faith in this entire system of government."

The Spring Offensive

In part, the peace movement is itself responsible for the failure of the political opposition to smoke out Nixon on what he really means by Vietnamization—the continuation of the war by primary reliance on Asian troops and U.S. air power. The peace movement has demonstrated remarkable strength, but it has not been able to sustain the pressure it can mobilize. It has lacked organization. It expresses itself through *ad hoc* committees, isolated demonstrations, marches, protests. But it has not been able to reach out and tap its natural constituencies, and it has indulged in tactics which have minimized the potential support for a strong political drive to end the war. Smashing a few windows in campus communities may relieve frustration; it does not explain to the various elements that oppose the war how it can be terminated. The first reactions to Laos were of this ill-advised variety; small groups of students at Stanford, Berkeley, Wisconsin, Columbia and other institutions breaking a few windows

IN THIS ISSUE

March 1, 1971

EDITORIALS

258

ARTICLES

262 Culebra: Island Besieged — *Robert Swann*

265 Army Blues: A Bureaucracy Adrift — *Edward F. Sherman*

275 Government Under Fire: The Demands of Consciousness II — *Herbert J. Gans*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

278 Simon: Movies Into Film — *Burton Bendow*

280 Heisenberg: Physics and Beyond — *Martin Lebowitz*

282 Borges: The Aleph and Other Stories — *Ronald Christ*

283 Nonperson (poem) — *Don Gordon*

284 Films — *Robert Hatch*

285 Theatre — *Harold Clurman*

286 Fat Cat (poem) — *Robert Watson*

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and overturning some furniture. These small-scale efforts have convinced the mass media that students have lost their enthusiasm for peace activities.

Actually, the converse is nearer the truth: most students who oppose the war—and they are a majority of students—have refused to be trapped into supporting random "trashing" activities. At Stanford, for example, responsible student leaders eyed the vandalism with nearly total disdain. As one of them said: "Let's not get to fighting each other over a couple of rocks or something." The fact is, as Kingman Brewster of Yale has commented, that "an eerie tranquillity" prevails at the moment. Guilford Dudley 3d, associate dean of students at Pennsylvania, points out in a letter to *The New York Times* (February 14) that to assume that students are quiescent is to misread the current campus scene. The feelings of outrage which Cambodia triggered, he feels, have been repressed, not expelled. But the longer these feelings are repressed and the more deeply, the greater is the potential for violence, particularly if students are provoked by casual and condescending brushoffs, unresponsive attitudes and attempts at repression—such, for example, as another conspiracy indictment which may well be in the offing.

Hence the upcoming spring peace offensive will be important; the risks and opportunities alike are clear. There have been three planning sessions: a December meeting of the National Peace Action Conference; a January meeting of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (the lineal descendant of the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the National Mobilization Committee, the New Mobilization Committee, and the National Coalition Against War, Racism and Repression), and a student conference convened in Ann Arbor, February 5 to 7, which included representatives of the National Student Association. As a result, a spring campaign has been projected: local protests in April; national mass actions against the war in Washington and San Francisco, provisionally set for April 24 by NPAC, and for May 2 by PCPJ and the student conference.

The test will be whether these efforts can force the Nixon Administration to come out from behind all those slick phrases and slogans and engage in a direct political confrontation with the anti-war forces, and whether the opposition in Congress can be induced to take a harder line against the war. All wings of the peace movement seem committed to the notion that mass protests must be staged now, rather than wait another year and a half for anti-war sentiment to emerge at the polls. For all its artful dodging, the Administration is vulnerable, but the political objective—commitment to withdrawal of troops by a fixed date—must not be subordinated to such tactics as abandoning junk cars or swimming nude in public fountains in the District of Columbia. Trashing for the sake of trashing should be rigorously ruled out. The objective should be to give the strongest possible political expression to the existing—and overwhelming—sentiment against the war; to bring it out, to make it heard. In brief, the objective should be to provide a means by which Mr. Conyers' question can find an answer.

The Highfliers

It may be only a recession, but it has some of the stigmata of a full-scale depression, brought about by high-style technology, reckless management, conglomeration, and a complex of other factors. It is a time of big insolvencies: Penn Central; Hayden, Stone; Lockheed; Rolls-Royce. The last two are correlated and at the moment appear to be the most educational for managers, bankers, taxpayers, the Pentagon, and the Nixon Administration—assuming that all, or any, of these are educable.

The interwoven Lockheed/Rolls-Royce debacles are a tragedy for laid-off engineers and other workers, subcontractors and their employees, merchants in the areas affected, et al. It is, however, possible to see in this complex international collapse some slight ray of hope—whenever fantasy is forced to give way to reality it is likely in the long run to profit those concerned, including even the impotent victims. But this is a painful kind of education, since people live and eat in the short run.

Touching only the high spots: Lockheed, trading on its proud position as the nation's leading defense contractor and with previous experience in producing airliners of varying quality (it lost $60 million on the prop-jet Electra), convinced itself that, out of its Pentagon profits and other financing, it could get back into the commercial market with the L-1011 "Tristar" (three-engine) airbus. At the same time, Rolls-Royce convinced itself that it could produce an engine that would power the L-1011 better than could General Electric or Pratt & Whitney, or at least as well and at lower cost.

Both of these conjunctive ideas were fantasies, based on the aerospace and military procurement theory that first you get the contract, then you go about getting the financing and finding out, by hit and miss, what the job will cost. Rolls made a contract for 540 engines for the Tristar at a fixed price of $156 million. It turned out that that was about half what it would cost to produce them. Losses on the contract finally exceeded Rolls's net worth of $456 million. The British Government declined to rescue Rolls in its entirety, though it will protect British military interests. Rolls was officially bankrupt.

Lockheed was bankrupt too, but not officially. It had snared the Pentagon contract for the C-5A cargo plane by the same underbidding technique that Rolls had used. It agreed to produce 115 C-5As for a ceiling price of $2.3 billion. Some of the ensuing troubles were perhaps not foreseeable—continuing inflation, for instance. Some were foreseeable but Lockheed chose to ignore them. Some were comical, in a way. The C-5A's tail being 6 stories high, the workers used up many man hours just climbing down to the "bathrooms"—*Time*, reporting this, doesn't like to say "toilets."

Lockheed's overall losses on defense contracts have proved to be enormous. Even after a lenient settlement incorporating a $200 million loss on the C-5A had been agreed on between Lockheed's toughest negotiator, Chairman Daniel Haughton, and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Lockheed's claimed loss on four defense projects amounted to $480 million. Then came the Rolls-Royce trouble to make things still more onerous for the American firm.

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If Lockheed now succeeds in making a deal for an American engine, it will have to adapt the L-1011 to accommodate it. That is not easy from an engineering standpoint; it might add as much as $100 million to the already devastating costs. Or perhaps the British Government will be cooperative, and a Rolls engine will power the L-1011 after all.

Somehow it will be worked out, the national defense and aerospace prestige being paramount. The Pentagon enables the United States to bestride the world like a colossus, and will surely survive. But since the Pentagon needs Lockheed as Lockheed needs the Pentagon, Lockheed will survive too, even if it collapses financially. *The Nation*, however, does not see eye to eye with either of these formidable entities, one healthy, the other ailing. It seems to us that what goes on here combines the worst of two possible worlds. Nothing could be more wasteful and demoralizing than military capitalism, except possibly military socialism, which is what we have now, masquerading as free enterprise. If there are profits, the defense contractor takes them; if there are losses, the Pentagon will bail the loser out—assuming that he is big enough.

'Power to the People'

That is the most recently adopted Presidential slogan, borrowed from groups who have little love for the President, and he as little for them. But, however eager one may be to give Mr. Nixon the benefit of the doubt, his record impels one to ask: does he mean it? In the matter of the Indochinese war, almost everyone would be relieved if he did. The exceptions are Messrs. Thieu and Ky and a remnant of unregenerate hawks. By all appearances, Mr. Nixon himself is among the diehards still bent on military victory.

But a majority of the people are not. The evidence is in the February 1 *Congressional Record*, where Senator McGovern discusses a January 1971 report by the American Institute of Public Opinion. Its survey was based on personal interviews with 1,502 adults in more than 300 scientifically selected localities across the country. The question was: "A proposal has been made in Congress to require the U.S. Government to bring home all U.S. troops before the end of this year. Would you like to have your Congressman vote for or against this proposal?"

Seventy-three per cent of those queried answered that they would want him to vote *for*. That was the national average. By categories, the percentages were:

Men	67	Republicans	64	College-Educated	60
Women	78	Democrats	78	High-school Ed.	75
		Independents	71	Grade-school Ed.	80

Moreover, there was a sensational about-face among those who in September 1970 wanted to continue the war. The 46 per cent of men who favored pulling out in September climbed to 67 per cent in January. In *every* category those who favor withdrawal before the end of this year showed a sizable increase. Oddly, the minimum gain was among the college bred, who switched from 47 per cent to 60 per cent. If, then, the President favors power to the people, here's his chance.

It is unlikely that he will take advantage of it. Mr. Nixon's words are not much guide to his sentiments and his actions. Said Richard Wilson of the *Des Moines Register & Tribune*, who knows Mr. Nixon well: "Nixon should tell the country clear and loud again that he will not end the war except upon a favorable basis to the future of South Vietnam and the future of American policy. *This is what he wants, and there is nothing to be gained by hiding his real purposes behind assurances that the war will be over by 1972"* (emphasis in original).

Yet Mr. Nixon may be passing up an opportunity that will not soon recur. The poll which Senator McGovern inserted in the *Congressional Record* had reference to the McGovern-Hatfield troop withdrawal amendment of the 91st Congress. The bill is being reintroduced this year as S-376, with a redoubtable list of sponsors. And in the House, Mrs. Abzug has introduced a resolution calling on the President to set the date for total withdrawal of all American forces by July 4, 1971. Mrs. Abzug likewise has an impressive list of sponsors.

The President cannot say he has not had fair warning. His sights may be set on 1972, but the outcome will be decided earlier—it is being decided right now.

The Early Dove

In the January 31 *Los Angeles Times*, under the headline, "Voice of Early Dove Still Heard Softly," Jules Witcover pays tribute to Ernest Gruening, governor of Alaska, 1939-53, U.S. Senator, 1956-66, and the holder of numerous other posts of high rank in government, journalism and public affairs. The greatest honor that has befallen him, however, is not in the offices he held but in what he did in the last one. With his colleague, Sen. Wayne Morse, now likewise retired, he was an early, vehement opponent of the Vietnamese War.

Witcover gives a comprehensive and sympathetic account of Gruening's career, omitting only his connection with *The Nation* (managing editor, 1920-23; editor, 1933-34; and editorial associate, 1969-). The reason that he has made only a few contributions to *The Nation* recently is that, at 84, he is writing his autobiography, which should remind the country of its debt to one of its most distinguished citizens.

Gruening began inveighing against the war in Vietnam in the early sixties, and, with Morse, voted against the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964, which passed the Senate 88 to 2. Some of the eighty-eight were aware that the evidence of the alleged North Vietnamese attack on a U.S. destroyer was spurious, but they went along. Gruening and Morse were of different mettle.

After Tonkin Gulf, Gruening told President Johnson that he was going to introduce a bill prohibiting the use of draftees in Vietnam—a parallel to the French ban that preceded Dienbienphu. "Oh, don't do that, please don't do that," Johnson said. "Ernest, if we're not out of there by next January (1966), you can do whatever you want." Then Johnson proceeded to escalate the war, ruining himself politically and historically.

Gruening likens us to the Germans in World War II. "The whole thing is just incredible that the American people could have been bamboozled by sheer mendacity at the top. And that mendacity continues to this day."

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CULEBRA: ISLAND BESIEGED

ROBERT SWANN

Mr. Swann designed and supervised the construction of the chapel on Culebra. After building cooperative and open-occupancy housing and Frank Lloyd Wright-designed homes, he built Everyman I, the trimaran which attempted to sail into the Pacific nuclear testing zone in 1962; he has constructed churches in Mississippi. A co-founder and staff member for several years of the New England Committee for Nonviolent Action, Mr. Swann is now president of the International Independence Institute, an organization working on land reform, credit reform and economic development in rural areas here and abroad.

On January 11 a seven-member Quaker Action Group team from the States arrived on the small island of Culebra, 20 miles east of Puerto Rico, to join with the local people (about 750 total population) and the Puerto Rican Independence Party in protests against the continued use of the island for bombing practice by the United States Navy. But on that day, important events, scheduled by powers in Washington and San Juan to take place on Culebra, threatened to change or prevent the demonstrations which we had been planning for weeks.

Along with other organizations, political and non-political, we had been invited by the Mayor of Culebra, Ramon Feliciano, to aid the local islanders in their long-sustained campaign to force the U.S. Navy to leave Culebra in peace, to stop the bombing which at times has been so heavy as to give some of the residential area the nickname of "Vietnam." Frequently—it happened once while we were there—bombing errors have endangered local citizens as well as Navy men (nine sailors were killed when an aircraft accidentally bombed an observation post).

In addition to the constant threat to human life, the entire ecology of the island has been endangered by the constant bombardment—including damage to the fishing on which many islanders depend for food and livelihood. Besides fishing, cattle farming is the basis for the island economy (Culebra is perhaps the only island of any size in the Caribbean that does not have a growing tourist business—the only possible "benefit" which the Navy's presence has bestowed). But cattle raising has also become a hazardous business, since the roaring and dive-bombing planes cause stampedes.

Although Culebra was supposedly ceded to the United States by Spain in the treaty of 1898 (legal research in Puerto Rico has raised some question as to whether Culebra was actually included in that treaty) and the Navy by Presidential decree was given control of the waters and access to Culebra, it was not until World War II that the Navy removed the families living in the northwest peninsula to another part of the island in order to set up its target practice there. Since then the people have been increasingly harassed and threatened, not only by the immediate danger of a bombing mistake (whether by plane or ship) but by the turmoil created in their own lives as the noise and pressure from the Navy has mounted. A bill was introduced recently in the U.S. Congress to remove all the inhabitants so that the Navy could use the entire island as a target. The official answer to the question: why couldn't the Navy move to an uninhabited island? (some do still exist), is that "the cost is too high." Speculation, however, has it that the real reasons are related to the strategic location of Culebra as a base for protection of the Panama Canal Zone, and the CIA's interest in the island as a base for its operations, the Navy's target practice providing a useful cover.

Faced with these pressures, the Mayor and the local Save Culebra Committee early last year hired a large Washington, D.C. law firm, Covington & Burling, to represent them in negotiations to reverse the take-over and force the Navy out. Before coming to Culebra I had talked with Richard Copaken, a member of the firm. He told me of his initial problem in attempting to negotiate with the Navy—that the Navy professed itself unable to believe that the islanders opposed the Navy's presence. When he asked if the Navy had ever taken a poll of the islanders, Joseph Grimes, the Navy spokesman, said it wasn't necessary, that he was certain nobody on the island objected. Thereupon, Copaken and another member of the firm took a poll of their own, one actually loaded in favor of the Navy. When presented with the results, which showed 95 per cent of the islanders opposed to the continued Navy presence, the Navy's answer was, in effect, "So what?"

The timing of the demonstrations was to coincide with the Navy's annual maneuvers and winter practice in the Caribbean (the Navy encourages enlistees and continued reserve training by offering an annual winter vacation, with pay, in the Caribbean). This year, however, an especially large-scale multination operation called "Operation Springboard" had been planned. At least seven nations, including Brazil, Ecuador, Britain and West Germany, were scheduled to attend. January 18 was the scheduled date for beginning maneuvers. It was also the date for the beginning of our demonstrations, which focused upon the building of a chapel in the bomb-target area as a symbol of the determination of the Culebrans to return to their former land and expel the Navy.

As the time drew near, the Navy had apparently decided to compromise, to make an "agreement" with the islanders. Copaken was called in by them and an agreement was hammered out in Washington on Friday, January 8. Next day, Copaken flew to Culebra to get the approval of the islanders at a meeting hastily called for that evening. Of some 100 persons who came to the meeting, fifty indicated approval, six or eight were opposed, and the rest did not vote—partly because they could hardly have been expected to understand an agreement which was read to them in Spanish for the first time, but for which no written Spanish document existed. It wasn't clear to many of the islanders what was being asked of them, but as later turned out, they were essentially agreeing to stop protesting against the Navy. In particular, the government as represented by the Mayor of Culebra, the Governor of Puerto Rico, and the legis-

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lature of Puerto Rico would use "moral suasion" to prevent further demonstrations. In return, the Navy would give up its attempt to take over more of the island and its claim to several hundred acres of land it already held. The Navy would confine itself to the northwest peninsula, an area of approximately 1,000 acres (out of a total of 7,000 on the island), but including Flamingo Bay where we were planning to build the chapel and which offered the most beautiful beach for swimming. The islanders were told that the agreement must be signed by the following Monday (January 11) or the Navy would deny it had ever existed.

Mayor Feliciano had been whisked off to San Juan for conferences with Governor Ferré and Hernandez Colón, president of the Senate, on Sunday, and rumors reached the island Monday morning, as our team was arriving, that an important new point would be added to the agreement (it was referred to as a "Peace Treaty" in the original document, but later that term was crossed out, although it remained visible). These rumors, to the effect that the Navy had agreed to a firm timetable for withdrawing entirely from the island in a "reasonable" period of two to three years, proved false, and Secretary of the Navy Chafee made that very clear to Mayor Feliciano just before the Mayor signed the document. (In his speech the Mayor had stated that such a time period did exist, but Chafee stepped in to clear up his confusion.)

On Sunday night the Save Culebra Committee had met and decided unanimously to ask the Mayor to delay signing the document for a few days, in order that everyone might have time to study it. It is not clear whether the Mayor ever received this message from the chairman of the committee, Tasso Soto, before the pomp and circumstance of the ceremony that had been quickly devised overwhelmed him (he was already feeling ill and took to his bed for several days afterward), or whether the false rumors of a definite time period had convinced everyone, including the Mayor, that signing meant victory. After Chafee denied the rumors, there were shouts of "Don't sign," but the Mayor was too ill, too confused, or too overwhelmed to refuse.

In the next few days word reached us that the agreement had been hailed by the San Juan press as a "historic document," and that the U.S. press had praised the Navy for its "sound judgment." The natives, however, remained restive, several members of the local committee resigning in protest. The Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) issued a statement calling the treaty a "fraud," and in a full-page ad rejected it clause by clause. Chegui Torres, a *San Juan Star* columnist, wrote that what he had observed proved that the Culebrans didn't understand what they were approving. PIP went further, saying this was the first time ever that a people had given permission to have themselves bombed. Looking back, it seems that the Navy's first objectives were to prevent further embarrassment during Operation Springboard and to put an end to the increasingly sympathetic articles and editorials in the United States, where even the *Armed Forces Journal* took exception to Navy policy. The Navy had probably long since given up its hope of seizing the whole island, but wanted something in return for relinquishing that dream.

PIP was eager to show its determination to resist and to expose the two leading parties in Puerto Rico, the NPP (Colón's party) and the PDP (Ferré's party) as being in collusion against the people of Culebra. During the week of January 11, there was a great deal of pushing and hauling, with several members of the local Culebra committee resigning and rejoining. Then on Friday the 15th, a meeting of the committee, with almost 100 per cent attendance, heard plans for the following week to build the chapel and stop Operation Springboard. Members of our team spoke first and then members from PIP presented their plans. The principal difference was in timing. Since Operation Springboard had postponed actual firing on Flamingo Bay until Thursday, January 21, our proposal was to begin construction on the Flamingo Bay beach then; but PIP had committed itself to Monday the 18th, and pushed for the earlier start. Since they were determined to go ahead, it was finally decided that the committee, our team and members of the clergy group in San Juan would join with PIP on the following Monday. This left only the weekend to prepare our plans and to pre-cut lumber and materials for Monday. Even the design had to be changed to meet the requests from the committee for a building somewhat larger and more appropriate than the symbolic structure called for by the original plans. The committee was serious about the chapel—for them it was more than symbolic. For PIP the confrontation was what counted.

Monday afternoon, on schedule, the parts had been pre-cut and the march to the beach began. Upon arrival we were confronted by Puerto Rican police, backed by the U.S. Marines and a contingent of Seabees who had been busy building an 8-foot cyclone fence ever since the "agreement" had been signed. The fence wasn't quite completed; it went across the peninsula (about a quarter of a mile) to within 20 feet of the water. It was easy to walk around it by way of the beach, which the six leaders promptly did after listening ceremoniously to the police read a warning that anyone trespassing beyond the fence would be subject to a federal jail sentence and a fine. More than fifty demonstrators followed behind the leaders, carrying lumber and other materials for the chapel. At that point, the Marines blew their cool. "Their" beach was being invaded and they couldn't stand idle. A half dozen or so of the fifteen Marines ran to grab the lumber from the hands of the demonstrators. A tug of war ensued with a few small pieces ending in the hands of the Marines. News photographers snapped pictures happily and one TV crew captured the entire struggle. The Marine commander suddenly came to his senses and yelled "Negative!" The Marines withdrew in uncertain order, even returning the lumber already taken —and the next day a *San Juan Star* headline read, "Navy beats retreat in beach invasion."

After recovering from the surprise of finding ourselves inside the impact area, we brought tools out and began assembling the trusses for the chapel. By the end of the day all five trusses had been completed, tents had arrived, food and other necessary items were brought by local people, and we began to settle in for the night on the beach opposite the Marine Corps and Seabee

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bivouac. Our tents were only 75 feet away, but the Marine commander in charge of "security" informed us that his men had strict orders against "fraternizing." The Seabee lieutenant, who was more friendly, said he had orders not to provide any "logistical" support—no water, trash cans, latrines, etc. I had asked him if we might have a spare transit, such tools being scarce on Culebra.

That night a half dozen or more Seabees joined our campfires to drink beer and talk about the demonstration. The next night, however, we got word that the Seabees were also under strict orders not to fraternize, and the Navy Operations Center (OP) about a half mile across the bay, was watching every move on the beach, as we discovered when we turned our radio to the Navy communications wave length. Many townspeople continued to show up, bringing us food and drinks every day and night that we were there.

The next day we set the footings for the chapel, using concrete blocks, which had to be carried in one by one, sea water to mix the cement, and a small level and board to square up the structure. By the following night, Wednesday, the 20th, the chapel was complete as far as we would go, with a plywood roof and a cross, of 2x4 lumber, facing out to sea.

Early in the evening the rumor spread that we might be arrested that night or early in the morning. Nights were difficult at best, what with the heat, the mosquitoes, and the Navy's floodlights which stayed on all night; but that night we got even less than the usual three or four hours' sleep as we remained half awake, expecting the bust. Early in the evening the Navy had sent in a truck with a powerful light which they turned on us, and we thought that was it. It turned out that the OP merely wanted to count the people on the beach—as we overheard on the radio.

Finally, at 8:30 the next morning, there arrived a truckload of U.S. marshals, smartly dressed in light-blue Superman jump suits with bright red insignia. They again read the injunction against trespassing and the warning on arrest, and then notified us that they would return in one hour, at which time anyone on the site would be arrested. We decided that only six persons should be arrested, including Ruben Berrios Martinez, chairman and leader of PIP, three other members of the party (including a resident), one of the clergy, and 18-year-old Dan Balderston, the only bona fide Quaker on our team.

At nine o'clock we held a dedication service in the chapel, a moving occasion during which several persons talked of their personal feelings and what this moment in history meant to them. It was evident that for the members of PIP this was a tremendously important experience; it was the first time they had been involved in a civil disobedience demonstration where arrest seemed almost certain. Within the party the commitment to nonviolence is a relatively new thing, as is the new ideology of socialism ("more like Sweden and Denmark than Cuba," as one of them said). One PIP member who was about to be arrested told me that he had resisted the idea of nonviolence: "Not until today have I understood how powerful nonviolence is. We have stopped the Navy and they are powerless to do anything about it. Now I am ready to go to jail."

The new PIP was born only a couple of years ago, and its young chairman, Berrios, has been aggressively leading his party along a path closer to Nehru's India than to Gandhi's. The old *independistas* followed a conservative economic and social line, in spite of leaders like Albizu Campos whose radicalism was more related to his dedication to independence than to an ideology of socialism. Berrios is an ardent student of Gandhi, and

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like Gandhi a lawyer; he is a professor of international law at the University of Puerto Rico. Like Gandhi also, Berrios takes a strong hand in major decision making, which seems confined to three or four of the top strategists within the party. We were told, for instance, that only one member of the Quaker team should be arrested, and no opportunity for discussing this issue seemed permissible (although it's true we didn't argue it because, as it happens, we didn't disagree).

Nine-thirty arrived and, with the service completed, all but the six to be arrested walked slowly out the gate. However, the marshals didn't arrive until nearly 10:30. They went inside the compound, but remained only a short time and made no arrests. Everyone began to wonder what was up. Were they bluffing? At 11:30 we held another service outside the fence, so that townspeople who had arrived by that time could be included. (Early in the morning the Navy had cut off the easy access around the beach by uncoiling a barbed-wire barricade from the end of the fence out into the water.)

After more than an hour the marshals returned again, this time with a proposal for the six inside. There would be no arrests if the six would leave the area, and a court case to decide the legal issues would be held in San Juan within a month. The offer was rejected and once more the marshals left, this time for the day. The six slept inside the chapel that night, trying to keep dry while a driving tropical storm blew rain the full length of the open-ended building. The next day, the vigil resumed outside the fence, the rain continuing to drench everything and everyone. Newsmen, including TV cameramen from NBC and CBS, had swarmed over the beach on the previous day, taking pictures of the activities, but waiting for the arrests in order to send back the "hard news." But as the rains poured down and the federal marshals stayed away, it began to seem that again no one would be arrested. By dark all of the newsmen had left; in any case, it was too late to make the Friday evening news broadcasts.

Then, the brave marshals struck. The six were arrested at 9:55 P.M., and quickly removed by helicopter to San Juan, where they were promptly released on their own recognizance and walked out through several hundred demonstrators waiting outside the federal building. The arrests, handled deftly to minimize the news impact and reduce pressure from Latin America, had the earmarks of State Department stage management.

Although the obvious purpose of the Navy was to handle the affair smoothly and without serious violence, on Monday, February 8, it took off its velvet gloves. Early in the morning it began moving equipment into the fenced-off area; 100 Marines appeared and by nightfall were tearing down the chapel. Culebrans who had been watching, went for reinforcements in town, and when they returned, entered the area (the gate had been left open; perhaps as a trap?). They were met with tear gas, and the Marines captured one of them, Mrs. Susan Diggs, while the others beat a retreat. Once outside, they began tearing down the fence. Mayor Feliciano arrived and was himself tear-gassed. Finally, police arrived from San Juan and took over from the Marines.

Those arrested must still go to court, so the story is not yet over. As Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua said in his column in the *San Juan Star*: "Fifteen days in January. From Saturday to Saturday, a truly historical event has occurred. . . . Six stand indicted in Federal Court. It is, once more, the stuff of martyrdom, and the U.S. will itself be on trial. It will have a lot to do with Puerto Rico's future." □

ARMY BLUES

A BUREAUCRACY ADRIFT

EDWARD F. SHERMAN
Mr. Sherman, assistant professor of law at Indiana University School of Law, has written extensively on military justice. He had been an Army officer, and has served as counsel in a number of free-speech cases involving the military.

The American military is today an institution in crisis, beset by critics on the outside and by dissension and scandal within. Rocked by adverse publicity about internal graft, breakdown of morale among the troops, and war atrocities, it has countered with a public relations campaign designed to project a new image. But behind the sparkle of press releases is the reality that the limited changes made thus far, although worth while, are unlikely to cure the malaise.

The truth is that the armed forces comprise a bureaucracy adrift from its traditional moorings, unsure of its present role, apprehensive as to its future, and defensive about its recent past. We seem to be witnessing one of those infrequent occasions when a powerful institution finds itself unable to cope with the times; the situation resembles that of American capitalism after the 1929 crash or the Catholic Church before the papacy of John XXIII. When an institution reaches that point it must either resign itself to continued crisis or undertake fundamental change.

Vietnam, of course, has had much to do with the military's current problems, but they cannot be explained simply by the fact that, as some claim, the military has been made the scapegoat for the war. The trouble goes much deeper, and, though it may have arisen during the war in Vietnam, it is not likely to disappear with the de-escalation or termination of that conflict.

First, the military is experiencing an inability to recruit, train and utilize its men so serious as to threaten its very survival. The tensions and animosities raised by the admin-

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istration of the draft laws during an unpopular war that does not require the services of all the country's young men have inevitably had their effect. Second, a breakdown has occurred in the dedication, efficiency and moral fiber of some career personnel, and that is always an omen of bureaucratic decay. And finally, the military's record during the years of Vietnam, in everything from the treatment of its own people to the conduct of battlefield operations, has raised doubt as to the compatibility of a number of its practices with contemporary democratic social values. The way in which these problems are resolved will have a profound effect upon the structure of the military, and indeed, of our democratic state.

Difficulty with its personnel is today the military's most serious problem. AWOL and desertion rates have tripled in the period of Vietnam; they are down slightly since the beginning of troop withdrawals, but are still far above prewar levels. A serviceman now goes AWOL every three minutes, the annual total being 250,000 AWOLs and desertions, or the equivalent of ten combat divisions. Well-established groups in both Europe and the Far East assist GIs desiring to desert, and the command in Vietnam is increasingly disturbed by the desertions of men on leave in Hong Kong and other Asian cities. But far more significant than overseas desertions is the rise of AWOLs from American bases, a practice so prevalent that many units are chronically under strength.

Courts-martial have risen dramatically during the war, both for military offenses (such as AWOL and disobedience) and for civilian crimes (such as homicide, larceny and drug offenses). Charges related to anti-war dissent have also boosted the court-martial statistics. As a result, some 20,000 servicemen are now incarcerated in military brigs, stockades and prisons. Military confinement facilities are frequently substandard and sometimes close to scandalous. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the average age of the prisoners is 19 and that only 5 per cent of them have committed acts which would be crimes under civilian law.

Racial tension and turmoil continue. Blacks complain bitterly of discrimination in assignments, promotions and military justice, and their dissatisfaction has not been appreciably lessened by 1969 Pentagon directives aimed at curbing such inequities and permitting blacks some cultural identity. Although about 13 per cent of enlisted men are black, Negroes constitute only 3.2 per cent of commissioned officers in the Army, 1.7 per cent in the Air Force, 1.2 per cent in the Marine Corps, and less than 1 per cent in the Navy. The services are entirely integrated, but racial traditions persist: most of the stewards and other Navy personnel who serve the officers on board ship are blacks or Orientals and, even at West Point, the dining hall "mess boys" are blacks and Latins.

A disproportionate number of career officers and non-commissioned officers are white Southerners, and blacks claim that they ignore Pentagon directives about race. Also, a great many military installations are in the South, and blacks do not enjoy serving at posts surrounded by communities that continue to discriminate in housing and other accommodations. The Department of Defense has not used its power to force integration in most Southern states by placing Jim Crow facilities "off-limits" (by contrast, when 440 black GIs held a "Call for Justice" meeting at the University of Heidelberg on July 4, 1970, the commanding general finally took "off-limits" action against some German landlords who practice discrimination).

Racial riots and violence, often resulting in injuries and sometimes in death, are common on military installations. Posts in Germany have been literally torn apart by clashes between black and white American soldiers. "Fragging" (tossing a hand grenade into a vehicle or room) has occurred so often in Vietnam—frequently against soldiers or officers of the other race—that it is now referred to as a separate type of crime. Although black and white servicemen work side by side, the races mix less and less at other times, and racial symbols—from "KKK"s scrawled on NCO club walls to the elaborate and time-consuming "liberation handshake" used by most black servicemen—indicate a high degree of racial separatism.

Blacks are especially unhappy about the administration of military justice. They complain that after racial clashes and for other offenses they are more often arrested and court-martialed than are whites, and that they are more frequently denied pretrial release (military law recognizes no right to bail, and liberty pending trial is discretionary with commanders). Court-martial statistics show that in some areas blacks suffer double the penalties imposed on whites for the same offense, and blacks make up an unduly large percentage of stockade and prison populations. The racial situation was described last year by an investigating committee of Marine officers at Camp Lejeune: "servicemen, both black and white, are being returned to civilian society with more deeply seated prejudices than were individually possessed upon entrance to service."

Akin to the problem of racial unrest is that of anti-war and political dissent. Since conscientious objection is the only ground for exemption from military service, and since the military has rejected most C.O. applications by servicemen (although federal courts have recently begun to overrule in such cases), there are many in the military who disagree with the war for personal, political or moral reasons. A few soldiers have chosen not to cooperate. Among these are Pvts. Dennis Mora, James Johnson and David Samas (the "Fort Hood 3") who refused to board ship for Vietnam in 1966, Capt. Howard Levy who refused to train Green Beret troops in 1967, and Capt. Dale Noyd who refused to train fighter pilots for Vietnam in 1968. However, the military's swift and severe response (the "Fort Hood 3" and Captain Levy were all given three-year sentences; Captain Noyd received one year) seems to have deterred such gestures, and men who oppose the war have increasingly sought other ways to make their views known.

The courts-martial have generally been tough also on mere expression of anti-war and political dissent. The first of the anti-war dissenters, Lt. Henry Howe, in 1965 received two years for carrying a sign critical of the Johnson administration's war policies in an off-post peace march while he was off duty and in civilian clothes. Since then hundreds of courts-martial, often resulting in heavy sentences, have been convened for such activities as making

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San Francisco Chronicle

"How Dare Fulbright Say We're Running U.S. Foreign Policy—I Thought We Were Running the Country."

anti-war statements to other servicemen (Pvts. George Daniels and William Harvey received ten and six years in 1967); handing out anti-war pamphlets (Pvts. Dan Amick and Ken Stolte received four years each in 1968); and publishing "disloyal statements" in an anti-war newspaper (Seaman Roger Priest was given a bad conduct discharge in 1970). Other protesters have been subjected to a variety of unfavorable administrative actions, ranging from petty harassment and reassignment (Sgt. Michael Sanders, an honor guard at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, was sent to Vietnam after he criticized the war) to court-martial on other charges (Pfc. Bruce Peterson, editor of a GI underground paper, was court-martialed for traces of marijuana found in the lint of his pocket) and undesirable discharge (Pfc. Dennis Davis, editor of another underground paper, was so discharged sixteen days before he would have honorably completed his tour of duty).

However, despite official hostility, anti-war attitudes have continued. Civil liberties organizations and anti-war groups have provided legal assistance in a number of military free-speech cases, and although many are still in the appeals courts, some victories have forced the military to permit certain types of free speech. In May 1969, after suffering unfavorable publicity for its handling of the Presidio "mutiny" and other dissent cases, the Army issued a Directive on Dissent which instructed commanders that servicemen have limited rights to possess written material, attend off-post meetings, join servicemen's unions, publish papers off-post, make complaints, and petition for redress of grievances. However, First Amendment rights are still much more limited for soldiers than for civilians, and nonconforming servicemen continue to be court-martialed under such vague offenses as "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," "uttering disloyal statements," and "conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the military."

Although the number of servicemen who have been willing to risk the consequences of anti-war activity has been small, the movement has established at least a foothold in the military as a result of organizing by both activist GIs and civilian groups. For example, an organization of hundreds of servicemen, called GIs United Against the War in Vietnam, arose in 1969 at Fort Jackson, S.C., from an evening when black and Puerto Rican GIs got together to listen to Malcolm X tapes played by a militant black, Pvt. Joe Miles. The group faced up to the authorities when it was denied its request for a meeting to discuss grievances and the war. Court-martial charges were brought against "the Fort Jackson 8," but were dropped when several black Congressmen exerted pressure. Miles was then transferred to Alaska, and other leaders were reassigned or discharged. This retaliation destroyed much of the effectiveness of the Fort Jackson organization, but it also helped to spread the movement.

Three of the most successful techniques of the "GI movement" have been coffee houses, newspapers and unions. The "coffee house movement" was started in 1968 by a group of veterans and anti-war activists. Ten or more GI coffee houses are now operating near military installations around the country. Despite intense opposition from both local authorities and the military (several of the places have been closed for violation of local ordinances, one was bombed, and most have been subjected to surveillance, raids and other harassment), the coffee houses have survived. Whereas they have not attracted a large GI clientele (a government agent testified recently that surveillance showed less than 400 servicemen attending in a week), they have provided a focus for anti-war activity as well as a casual, bohemian atmosphere not available at official servicemen's clubs.

Anti-war newspapers, published either by civilian anti-war activists or by GIs off duty, have sprung up at posts around the country. The papers, with such puckish names as *The Last Harass* (Fort Gordon), *Left Face* (Fort McClellan), *The Star Spangled Bummer* (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base), and *Fun, Travel, and Adventure* (Fort Knox), publish a barrage of anti-war and anti-brass rhetoric ranging from revolutionary exhortation to relatively moderate proposals for military reform. They are almost without exception banned from military installations, but reach many GIs off-post and through surreptitious distribution in orderly rooms and barracks.

The GI union movement began in 1967 when then Pvt. Andy Stapp founded the American Servicemen's Union. Combining elements of the American labor union tradition with a Marxist political philosophy, it is fiercely anti-brass and anti-military. It now claims some 20,000 members, and through its newspaper, *The Bond*, advocates such revolutionary changes in the military as the right to disobey illegal orders ("like orders to fight in the illegal, imperialistic war in Vietnam"), election of officers by the men, abolition of saluting and "sir-ing" officers, an end to use of troops in ghetto riots and strikes, and the right to bargain collectively.

The GI Association, a union formed by San Francisco Bay servicemen in early 1969, offers a milder program designed to cure such abuses as dishonest recruiting campaigns and enlistment contracts, arbitrary disciplinary procedures, and less than honorable discharge policies, but has remained a local group. The Movement for a Democratic Military, aided by Jane Fonda, Mark Lane and other

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civilians, has organized Marines, the majority of them black, at Camp Pendleton, Calif. It disclaims an interest in mass membership, seeking instead to recruit a cadre of well-trained GI organizers. Its revolutionary program calls for basic changes in the military which would convert it into a "people's army" whose primary mission would be to provide services for the people rather than engage in external defense and warfare.

The GI union movement worries military policy makers, for they recognize that the complaints of the serviceman —on everything from pay to working and living conditions—are legion and that the union model attracts many soldiers. Commanders have been ordered under no circumstances to recognize or bargain with GI unions, and union organizers have been spied on, harassed, and subjected to unfavorable administrative actions. The commanding general of the First Army warned commanders in March 1969 that they must take steps to counteract the union movement. "The key," his directive stated, "is to remove the motivation to join a collective bargaining unit by convincing the soldier that those in positions of authority have a direct interest in his welfare and morale."

Although anti-war dissent will undoubtedly decrease in the services if de-escalation of the war continues, it is improbable that GI organizing will cease. The grievances —low pay, lack of personal rights, the unattractiveness of military life, the philosophy of militarism, racial turmoil— will still be there when peace comes. The history of the GI movement is itself instructive. While it was sustained at first primarily by college-educated servicemen who opposed the war on political or moral grounds, it is now made up for the most part of young men in the "have-not" categories: high school dropouts, blacks, Puerto Ricans, poor Southern whites. The armed services of the future, whether volunteer or not, will be increasingly drawn from these groups, and it is no wonder that the command looks askance at their activation into a dissent movement.

The military is also experiencing a serious morale problem, quite apart from racial and political disaffection. Some of it undoubtedly stems from the tarnished public image it has earned in the more recent period of the war in Vietnam, and from demoralization caused by the unsuccessful course of that war. But the problem seems to go deeper; men in the ranks, both short-timers and career men, apparently find little personal satisfaction today in the services. A symptom is the consumption of drugs and alcohol. Almost all the men overseas use marijuana or more dangerous drugs, and at home the incidence is higher in the military than in any other area of society, except possibly the ghettos. Testifying before a Senate subcommittee on juvenile delinquency last October, the Army disclosed that eighty-nine American soldiers may have died in Vietnam during the preceding ten months from overdoses of drugs, and that 746 men were admitted to medical facilities for drug problems in the first nine months of 1970, compared with 527 cases during all of 1969. Deaths from overdoses of heroin are said to average about two a day in Vietnam. Five Air Force Academy cadets resigned last fall under threat of court-martial for possessing marijuana, and allegations of drug abuse were made against fourteen others.



Pearson, Knickerbocker News (Albany, N.Y.)
"He Must Be the Sergeant Who Runs the Service Club"

Alcohol is a problem for the older servicemen. Testimony last year before Sen. Harold Hughes's subcommittee on alcoholism and narcotics indicated serious drinking problems among career men, especially NCOs. A former master sergeant told of heavy drinking at a nuclear missile base, and an Air Force pilot described similar drinking on top-secret missions. Maj. Avrom Segal, chief of neurology and psychiatry at Fort Meade, testified that alcoholism in the military has been "too long hidden, ignored and mistreated. The higher up men are, the more dangerous it is and the more it is hidden." Heavy drinking has always been in the military tradition, and has been encouraged by low prices at officers' and servicemen's clubs. But the heavy consumption may also be related to the quality of military life—the boredom of many jobs, the unattractiveness of life at many military posts, the lack of self-respect (especially among career NCOs) engendered by the more brutal side of the military caste system, anxieties over promotions and cutbacks, and the inability to derive satisfaction from job and status. These problems are found in many areas of American life today, but the military, especially, has failed to acknowledge them.

There are still other difficulties. Length of service has fallen among both officers and noncommissioned officers. A majority of West Pointers now quit the Army as soon as their mandatory tour is up. The noncommissioned corps, backbone of the traditional military unit structure, has been rocked by scandals. In hearings before the Senate subcommittee on investigations, Sgt. Maj. William O. Wooldridge, appointed by the Army Chief of Staff in 1966 to a newly created position as the highest enlisted man in the Army, was charged with being part of a worldwide clique of sergeants who siphoned off funds from service clubs, took kickbacks from suppliers and racketeers,

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and engaged in smuggling. They were allegedly protected by high-ranking officers, including Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, Provost Marshal of the Army, who was accused of altering records and whitewashing investigations to protect Sergeant Wooldridge, and who was recently indicted on charges of accepting gifts, and embezzlement. Wooldridge, in turn, has been indicted on charges of defrauding the government. There was also evidence that NCOs and high-ranking officers took kickbacks from businessmen and gamblers in connection with a $27.5 million slot-machine operation in overseas service clubs.

In November, a House military operations subcommittee reported that investigators have confirmed a widespread network whereby noncommissioned officers and enlisted men in Thailand have diverted drugs and PX goods into the black market and doctored pay records and promotions. Falsification and favoritism were also recently uncovered in the awarding of combat medals. Facts were invented to justify the presentation of a Silver Star for valor to Brig. Gen. Eugene P. Forrester, assistant commander of the First Cavalry Division in Vietnam. The fraud had been ordered by a colonel who admitted that as far as he knew the general had done nothing of conspicuous valor. Since then, a number of other disclosures have shown carelessness and favoritism in the distribution of medals.

The military's most serious personnel problem in Vietnam, and its greatest public embarrassment, have arisen from the conduct of its men on the battlefield. It is not that the troops have fought poorly. There have been few cases of cowardice, and the level of technical competence has been generally high. One serious combat failure was the loss of the *Pueblo* in January 1969, but, despite bungling by the Naval command in not providing adequate support and by the ship's crew in being caught off guard and failing to destroy intelligence documents, the surrender of the ship by Commander Bucher without firing a shot seems to have been a humane and militarily realistic act.

The problem with American combat performance has been in the failure of commanders and troops to restrict their tremendous firepower to legally permissible targets and to restrain their frustrations when in contact with the enemy and the Vietnamese populace. Since the large-scale intervention in 1965, Americans have murdered many individual Vietnamese civilians in battlefield situations. A large percentage of these crimes appears not to have been reported or to have been ignored by commanders. Some resulted in courts-martial, but military justice has not been distinguished in these cases.

The men charged with murder in the early part of the war were frequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, but many verdicts have since been reversed for inadequate investigation, inept prosecution, or prejudicial error in the court-martial proceedings. For example, the life sentence meted out to Marine Cpl. Stanley Luczko for murdering a Vietnamese man and woman while on patrol in 1966 was set aside after several Boston attorneys found serious discrepancies in the trial transcript; on retrial Luczko received three years. The conviction of Capt. John J. McCarthy for killing an alleged Cambodian agent in 1967 was reversed by an Army appeals court for technical errors, and the Army decided not to retry him.

As the war has dragged on and battlefield crimes have continued, courts-martial have become lenient. An Army court last May found Lt. James B. Duffy guilty of murdering a Vietnamese prisoner, but on learning that a life sentence was mandatory, entered a new verdict of negligent homicide and imposed a sentence of six months.

Although it had long been known among U.S. servicemen in Vietnam that murder and other violations of the law of land warfare were sometimes condoned by policies, customs, or individual commanders, the Green Beret murder case first brought such practices before the general public. After the press broke the story in August 1969, when one of the Green Berets involved, Sgt. Alvin L. Smith, Jr., sought asylum at the CIA office in Nhatrang, Vietnam, the Army filed charges of murder against Col. Robert B. Rheault, commander of Special Forces in Vietnam, and seven other Green Beret officers and NCOs. However, the prosecution was suddenly dropped by unprecedented action of the Secretary of the Army on the ground that the CIA would not allow its personnel to testify. The defendants were shipped home and discharged honorably, bringing this episode to an inconclusive and unsatisfying end.

From then on, stories of American atrocities and illegal battlefield practices began to filter into the press. Robin Moore, author of *The Green Berets*, boasted that he had attended assassination schools and had himself shot a person thought to be a double agent. Some of the testimony given at the hearings held in Stockholm in 1967 by the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal—dismissed by most Americans as fabricated propaganda, a judgment encouraged by the propagandistic atmosphere of the hearings—began to be cited again and to appear more believable. This new atmosphere encouraged ex-serviceman Ronald Riddenhour to write the Secretary of Defense and twenty-three members of Congress about the stories he had heard of a massacre at My Lai. The Army began another investigation, but its handling of the case, as in the past, has been hardly straightforward. Court-martial charges were quietly filed against Lt. William Calley on September 5, 1969, in Georgia, with no indication given of the enormity of the offense charged or that others were involved.

The American army will never be the same after My Lai. Individual battlefield murders can be prosecuted and forgotten, but the acts committed at My Lai were too closely associated with sanctioned practices and policies not to reflect directly upon the military itself. American tactics in Vietnam—search and destroy missions, body counts, the interdiction and saturation bombing of populous areas, indiscriminate use of chemicals and firepower (which have been so well described in Telford Taylor's *Nuremberg and Vietnam*), are all inextricably involved in the trial of the My Lai defendants.

The savagery of what occurred at My Lai, and recent revelations of other battlefield atrocities (the December hearings conducted in Washington by the Citizens' Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam produced the strongest evidence to date of widespread, offi-

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cially condoned violations of the laws of land warfare), inevitably raise issues as to the ultimate responsibility of officers who had command control over operations. Despite the recent dismissal of charges against Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Koster, commander of the Americal Division, and against other officers in the chain of command above Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina, the question as to their responsibility for My Lai and for the cover-up of the incident has not really been answered. Charges by one My Lai defendant, Sgt. Esequiel Torres, that Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam, allowed prisoners to be beaten in his presence, and disclosures that after My Lai Gen. William Westmoreland, who had overall responsibility for the operation, telegraphed congratulations to the commanders immediately involved, raise the nagging question of command culpability under the Nuremberg principles. Americans may not wish to be reminded that a U.S. military tribunal in 1945 sentenced to death and executed Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of Japanese troops in the Philippines, for massacres committed by his troops, the reasoning being that, although he did not have knowledge of the crimes, he was ultimately responsible.

The handling of the My Lai cases has deeply divided officers in decision-making positions in the Pentagon. Some, encouraged by the position of the late Mendel Rivers that we have no business prosecuting our own boys for killing the enemy, opposed the trials. They argued that public clamor would subside and that prosecutions could only tarnish the Army's image and lower the morale of its career men. But those in favor of the indictments prevailed, some of them aroused by the criminality of the acts, some disturbed by the failure of Army officers to live up to the standards and traditions of the military, and some motivated by the pragmatic consideration that if the Army did not act someone else would.

The Army deserves considerable credit for persevering with the courts-martial despite the bad publicity, but the trials themselves have been less than satisfactory. The Pentagon has played a key role, deciding who should be prosecuted; selecting the posts at which the trials were to be held, with an eye to which commanders could be relied on to perform as desired; assigning special personnel with detailed instructions to serve as counsel, judges and other administrators. Thus an aura of command control, even of manipulation, has given the public an uneasy feeling that the My Lai verdicts have been going according to plan. The first two defendants, Sgt. Clarence Mitchell and Sgt. Charles Hutto, were acquitted after trials in which the prosecution failed to elicit considerable incriminating evidence that has come out in later trials, a failure which was only partially explicable in the Mitchell case by the military judge's refusal to permit testimony by witnesses who had previously testified before a Congressional investigating committee. The Army's claim that dismissal of charges against the other enlisted men was necessitated by the Mitchell and Hutto acquittals seems doubtful under the law.

The recent dismissal of charges against General Koster and the other officers in the chain of command was severely criticized by Wall Street attorney Robert MacCrate, special counsel to the inquiry panel headed by



Conrad, Los Angeles Times

General Peers, whose report had led to the filing of the court-martial charges. Thus it is beginning to appear that Lieutenant Calley, the sole defendant whom the Army has prosecuted in a strong and adversary manner, and possibly Captain Medina, will be the only individuals held responsible for My Lai.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the My Lai trials has been their effect upon the American commitment to the Nuremberg principles. Most My Lai defendants have relied upon the defense that they were following orders, a position specifically rejected by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Although there was substantial evidence that Hutto killed unarmed civilians at My Lai, he was acquitted after a defense that he was only obeying orders, as he had been trained to do. His civilian attorney, a lieutenant colonel in the Army reserves, commented after the verdict that the system of military discipline itself had been at stake.

Making sure that soldiers will question illegal orders is, of course, exactly what the Nuremberg principles were intended to accomplish. In the 1945 "Einsatzgruppen Case," a Nuremberg tribunal stated:

> The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent. He does not respond like a piece of machinery. It is a fallacy of widespread consumption that a soldier is required to do everything his superior officer orders him to do.

This language was quoted with approval in a 1953 American court-martial case (*U.S.* v. *Kinder*), where it was held that a soldier who had been ordered by his lieutenant to shoot a Korean POW had no defense to murder. The military judge in the Hutto case instructed that obedience to orders is not a defense, but the court-martial, made up primarily of career officers with combat experience in Vietnam, decided otherwise.

The facts are that the Nuremberg principles are not

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as obvious and simple as was believed by the Allied tribunals which tried German and Japanese officials after World War II, and that in practice they have never really been accepted by the military. American soldiers are still conditioned in basic training to do mechanically whatever their superiors order. Servicemen have never been successful in attempts to justify disobedience on the ground that the orders given them were illegal under the Nuremberg principles.

The My Lai courts-martial have shown how difficult it is to hold to principles when one's own men are the defendants and when basic disciplinary policies seem to be threatened. The military response, as shown by the careful and limited selection of defendants and by the unwillingness of career officers to convict, seems increasingly to be one of expediency, with no basic commitment to the Nuremberg position. Public opinion, as shown by patriotic displays of confidence in Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina and by opinion polls indicating substantial opposition to trying the My Lai defendants, indicates a similar lack of concern.

My Lai has been the military's greatest embarrassment in the Vietnamese War, but similar excesses have cropped up elsewhere. Two blatant examples are the surveillance of civilians by military intelligence organizations in the United States and the use of chemical defoliants in Southeast Asia.

The Army began to investigate civilians in 1967 when it decided that it needed intelligence information if troops were to be used in civil disturbances, as they had been in the July ghetto riots in Detroit. Military intelligence units around the country quickly adapted to spying on civilians, some 1,200 field investigators under the Army intelligence command at Fort Holabird, Md., taking primary responsibility. The persons to be watched were loosely defined as those "who might be involved in civil disturbance situations." Some commanders had a special interest in the SDS or the Yippies or just plain hippies, some in peace and civil rights organizations, and some in politicians like Sen. William Fulbright and Adlai Stevenson III.

Agents infiltrated radical and civil rights groups, took pictures of people attending peace rallies, even had a disguised TV news van at the 1968 Democratic convention. Data banks were set up at Fort Holabird, Fort Monroe, Va., and Fort Hood, Tex., to store the information. Other services also expanded their intelligence activities to include civilian surveillance, and at some places, like the Colorado Springs area (which has a number of Air Force installations and a large Army post), military agents were so numerous that they must have made up a good part of the audience at peace demonstrations and of membership in radical groups.

These activities were first made public in January 1970 in the *Washington Monthly* by a former Army intelligence officer, Christopher H. Pyle. The Army admitted some of the activities, but said they had been drastically curtailed and that the data banks had been destroyed. It was later learned that the information from the data banks had apparently been transferred to computers in other federal agencies. The ACLU, claiming that surveillance and other activities were continuing, filed federal suits in Chicago and Washington, D.C. In December 1970, a startled federal court in Chicago heard testimony from John M. O'Brien, an Army intelligence agent in the Chicago field office from June 1969 to June 1970, that surveillance had continued in violation of higher directives and had included Senator Stevenson, ex-Governor Otto Kerner and Rep. Abner Mikva among some 800 civilians. The Secretary of the Army's office denied the spying when questioned by the angry Sen. Sam Ervin, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights; but it has now equivocated, raising speculation that directives curbing surveillance have not been followed.

These disclosures suggest a classic case of bureaucratic empire building in which the military, having been asked to provide troops for certain civil disturbances, went far beyond the reasonable needs of intelligence and trespassed on traditional spheres of civilian authority. The most significant point is that the operation seems to have grown to outrageous proportions with little direction from, and in some cases knowledge of, the civilian Secretary.

The use of defoliants in Vietnam involves a similar failure to report facts accurately to civilian superiors and a disturbing disregard by military planners of the consequences of their actions. Two RAND Corporation studies made for the Defense Department in 1967 showed that heavy spraying with chemical defoliants was having little effect upon enemy food supplies and was doing major damage to friendly farmers. However, the Army continued widespread defoliation, with, it is now reported, serious ecological effects upon parts of South Vietnam. The Administration has ordered a "rapid phaseout" of chemical spraying in Vietnam, thus bringing to an end another tactical error by military planners, which did not aid our forces and which will continue to have tragic consequences for South Vietnam in the future.

The military's interest in germ warfare is a similar case of poor judgment and misinterpretation of mission. In the

Huffaker, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.)

"This Is Ridiculous. Get Me Ervin's File."

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early days of the war, the Pentagon saw germ warfare as just another weapons system, and gave little thought in its development to other than military considerations. Recently, the Administration overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ordered unilateral elimination of stocks of biological weapons, now valued at $726 million. Tactical errors and expensive mistakes in the development of weapons systems are common in warfare, but the appearance of ever more sophisticated weapons systems has made the mistakes of this war especially costly, and the side effects of such weaponry upon the environment and the population of Vietnam have made their indiscriminate use much more disastrous.

Blame for the disaster in Vietnam does not lie with the military alone; many tactical blunders were made by civilian planners (a panel of high-ranking military officers, appointed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, submitted in November 1970 a three-volume report that places on the Johnson administration responsibility for many of the Vietnamese war failures). However, in the final tally, the military's overconfidence in its weaponry, insensitivity to political, social and human problems, lack of candor and realism in reporting to the government, and its sometimes outrageously bad judgment will bear a large share of the blame for the conduct of the war.

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It is a temptation, after a look as critical as this has been at the military's contemporary problems, to conclude that the armed forces are on the verge of dissolution. This view is held today both by some members of the anti-war movement, who predict a GI revolt and the collapse of the military, and by some champions of old-time Army ways, who warn that the weakening of discipline and traditional military attitudes will destroy efficiency. Stewart Alsop's recent proclamation in *Newsweek*—"The whole army is in danger of going plumb to hell"—is heard in similar phrasing around the country.

Despite the drama of such apocalyptic prophecies, the military institution is still needed in our society, and it will survive. The real question is how the military will make necessary changes. It has been slow to respond, but recent reforms directed toward the serious personal matters are a frail but hopeful sign.

The training of its men has been one of the most traditional and unchanging aspects of military life. The methods used today are not much different from those of World War II and World War I. Recruits are subjected to physical hardship, stress situations and enforced obedience, and military administrators freely admit that the process is intended to disrupt civilian patterns of response, replace individual gratifications with group goals, inculcate unquestioning acceptance of authority, and develop conformity to proper military attitudes and conduct.

After World War II there were so many complaints about military training and discipline that a board, headed by Gen. James Doolittle, was appointed to look into the matter. After holding hearings and considering thousands of letters, the board called for a complete overhaul of the military personnel system. "There is a need for a new philosophy in the military order," it said, "a policy of treatment of men, especially in the 'ranks,' in terms of advanced concepts of social thinking. The present system does not permit full recognition of the dignities of man." The Doolittle report quickly drew fire from the career personnel, and its proposals were almost entirely rejected.

In the summer of 1969, the military broke for the first time with its traditional disciplinary policies. Oddly enough, the Marine Corps, which today is the holdout against liberalization, was the initiator. After a summer of serious racial unrest at bases around the world, the Marine Corps commandant issued a directive which granted blacks such concessions as wearing an Afro haircut (if not more than 3 inches on top and neatly trimmed), having "soul" music in service clubs, and giving the Black Power clenched fist salute to one another. The other services quickly made similar concessions.

The new haircut rule was startling, for a shaved head or close cut was the very symbol for many career military of good order and obedience. Once the concession had been made to blacks, it was difficult to withhold it from whites. Thus in May 1970, the Army issued new regulations permitting mustaches (beards and goatees are still forbidden), and sideburns down to the top of the ear lobe, and stating that excessively short haircuts are "degrading or de-personalizing." Except for the Marine Corps, the other services have followed suit.

Once the haircut tradition was broken, all the other demands of discipline that had little more than tradition to justify them were brought into question. The man who led the attack was Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. Appointed Chief of Naval Operations in 1970, Zumwalt began issuing directives, quickly labeled "Z-grams," which set the old "Mickey Mouse" demands of discipline on their ears. Z-grams approved beer-vending machines in enlisted men's barracks and alcohol in individual rooms, eased provisions for overnight passes, permitted motorcycles on Naval bases, established five "hard rock" enlisted men's clubs, and ordered that sailors should not have to wait in line more than fifteen minutes for anything.

The Army, not to be caught lagging, issued its own iconoclastic regulations. Practices synonymous with good order and discipline—early reveille, prohibition of beer in barracks, bed check, tight "pass" restrictions—are suddenly gone from Army life. Meanwhile, experimental basic training programs have been proceeding at Fort Ord, Calif., and other posts, the notion being that recruits should be treated with dignity, addressed as "soldier" rather than "dud" or "eight-ball," and be safe from hazing, harassment or mass punishment. At Fort Carson, Colo., Major General Rogers has initiated projects to have men housed in rooms rather than communal barracks and to let them decorate rooms and barracks according to their taste. At Fort Bragg, N.C., a drug addiction program uses a psychedelic "shoot-up" room to treat addicts who, under new Army regulations, are not subject to court-martial if they turn themselves in. Only the Marine Corps has resisted the "humanizing" changes, maintaining its devotion to rigid discipline and physical toughness.

Encouraging though these reforms are, their effect has been grossly exaggerated in the press. They are addressed primarily to minor irritants and make no funda-

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nental changes in the understructure of the military disciplinary system. Furthermore, junior officers and NCOs have shown in the past an impressive capacity to preserve traditional practices in the face of contrary directives. For example, Army regulations have for some time forbidden "degrading or depersonalizing actions" toward soldiers, and have required that men be given assignments for which they are "physically, mentally and psychologically suited." One need not have much familiarity with military life to know that little more than lip service is paid to such directives. Similarly, physical punishment of recruits has been forbidden since six Marines died on a forced march at Parris Island, S.C., in 1956. But Dr. Waldo B. Lyon, depot psychologist at Parris Island from 1961 to 1968, has stated: "The change in training methods has largely been a change in form, not in substance. . . . No matter how much the colonels and the generals intervene against maltreatment, the drill instructors know better."

It would be a mistake, thus, to suppose that recent changes have transformed the military into a benign bureaucracy. Just a few examples of recent actions should indicate that commanders can still be extremely arbitrary and that many policies and practices are still irrational and unjust:

¶West Point Cadet William G. Puckett was expelled last November after he voluntarily reported that he now realized he had incorrectly told an upper classman that he had shined his shoes the night before instead of two days earlier.

¶Last year a brigade commander at Fort Benning, Ga., constructed a detention center surrounded by a high barbed-wire fence to which he sentences members of his unit—mostly veterans of Vietnam awaiting discharge —for minor infringements of dress and disciplinary regulations. He does this under his "non-judicial punishment" powers, despite the fact that the Uniform Code of Military Justice bars confinement without a court-martial. A federal court suit challenging the action is pending.

¶Spec. 5 Robert Lawrence was relieved of his duties last year and threatened with court-martial for saying on the Armed Forces Vietnam Network that his news reports had been censored. Servicemen in Vietnam are deprived of almost all "unfavorable" news, even though such stories appear in the United States.

¶Members of the Army band at Fort Wadsworth, N.Y., who last summer signed a statement expressing opposition to the war in Vietnam, were subjected to extra duties, denied usual privileges such as passes, threatened with court-martial and in some cases suddenly transferred to less desirable posts. Just this month Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein of Brooklyn ordered that the band's drum major and baritone horn player, Spec. 4 David B. Cortright, be brought back from his exile at Fort Bliss, Tex.

¶Civilian attorneys working for the Lawyers Military Defense Committee, a nonprofit organization that provides lawyers without fee to soldiers in Vietnam, have been denied such military facilities as air transportation, telephones and postal services. On January 3, a military judge in Saigon found that denial of such facilities (available to thousands of civilians, including press, church groups and even a house of prostitution) made it "extremely difficult" for LMDC lawyers to represent their client, Pvt. Gerald D. McLemore, in a murder trial. But, the judge continued, there had been no violation of regulations or of the defendant's rights.

¶Two Navy officers, Lieutenants Canfield and Holesek, were removed from their ship in Vietnam recently and threatened with disciplinary action or court-martial for writing to higher commanders and members of Congress concerning local command policies which they claimed improperly denied leaves for long periods and misused the power of non-judicial punishment.

¶Most of the twenty-eight young Navy officers who last fall formed a group called Concerned Officers Movement to express their opposition to war policies in Vietnam have been relieved of their duties, stripped of their security clearances, and transferred or discharged.

¶Air Force nurse Capt. Susan Struck was ordered discharged late last year for giving birth to a baby while unmarried, and Air Force Capt. Tommie Sue Smith, a divorcée, was not permitted to take her son with her when she was transferred to the Philippines, although there was no one else to care for him. Both women have filed court actions.

¶A study of homosexuality in the military by Drs. Colin J. Williams and Martin S. Weinberg of the Indiana University Kinsey Institute for Sex Research indicates insensitivity to the problem, barbaric treatment of homosexuals in stockades, and serious injustices done them in courts-martial and less-than-honorable discharges.

These, and countless other examples, indicate that all is not yet right with the military. If the military really intends to meet its problems, further reforms along the following lines appear essential:

Discipline and Training. The military must take positive steps to change two traditional objectives of military discipline and training—unquestioning obedience to commands and conformity to official attitudes. The Nuremberg principles can be complied with only if servicemen fully understand that obedience is not an absolute requirement and that they have an obligation not to carry out unlawful orders. This cannot be accomplished as long as the military is permitted to use terror and brutality in basic training to inculcate unquestioning submission to authority.

Traditional military men recoil from the suggestion that blind obedience should not be central to training and discipline, but in a day when the great majority of servicemen will see no combat (only about 10 per cent of today's troops have combat specialties), when substantial numbers live off-post and work from nine to five, and when, even in combat, initiative and intelligent reaction have replaced automatic response to orders, the justification for absolute obedience is questionable. The civilian paramilitary, like police and firemen, have long demonstrated that men function most effectively in life-endangering activities under a normal superior-subordinate relationship that does not require reflex compliance with orders.

Even less defensible is the emphasis upon ideological attitudinal conformity. American courts have recognized that other public employees—civil servants, schoolteachers, policemen—have a right to participate in social and political dialogues and to criticize government policies.

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It is time to admit that ideological conformity is not the mark of an efficient and loyal serviceman and that a military which requires it may be a danger to a democracy. If, as now seems probable, the country moves to a volunteer military, it is especially important that the men who join up be permitted free discussion of ideas and policies, lest they become a mercenary force unresponsive to and out of touch with the needs and values of society.

The recent personnel reforms are important first steps to establishing that there is room in the services for pluralism of cultural, racial and individual attitudes and life styles. However, the attitude still predominant in the military is authoritarian, anti-individualistic and, as Ward Just observed in his excellent book, *Military Men,* "relentlessly anti-intellectual, as distinguished from being anti-brains." For every Admiral Zumwalt there are a hundred officers and NCOs who are convinced that individual diversity is dangerous and who can exercise broad discretionary powers to require conformity.

The military still clings to he-man values of hardship and love of war that have little in common with the norms of contemporary American society. For example, it is still felt that every recruit must be imbued in basic training with the "kill" mentality described in a post-World War I monograph by Gen. W. Haan: "Bayonet training is possible only because every red-blooded man naturally possesses the fighting instinct. This inherent desire to fight and kill must be carefully watched for and encouraged by the instructor. . . . The recruit must long to test his ability against an enemy's body, to prove that his bayonet is irresistible. He pictures an enemy at every practice thrust and drives home his bayonet with strength, precision and satisfaction." In basic training, the recruit is still subjected to "character-building" programs that often display little familiarity with modern educational and psychological theories; to "indoctrination" programs that contain appeals to patriotism so unsophisticated and banal that many recruits do not relate to them; and to "competitions" designed to develop group consciousness and *esprit de corps* that are seen as patently artificial.

There is serious doubt that these methods and the objectives they seek are any longer either good training or consistent with the objective of maintaining a military that will preserve, rather than endanger, national values. The comment by Paul Meadlo's mother, "I raised him as a good boy and they have made a murderer out of him," and the popular button of several years ago that read "The Marine Corps Builds Oswalds" express some of the misgivings which Americans have about the methods used to convert young men into soldiers.

Albert D. Biderman, senior research associate of Social Science Research, Inc., has observed that "the military institution suffers from many disabling neuroticisms when it exists in a society and in a world that does not regard combat as one of the most honorable and exalted of human activities." That is exactly the problem for many young recruits who, because of racial, cultural, moral or individual attitudes, cannot relate to present military values. Biderman has suggested that the central function of the military might be redefined to embrace primarily non-combat objectives; others have thought that, although the services must be ready for combat, they should function more like police departments which view their role in positive terms and permit much greater individuality.

The Military Caste System. Perhaps the most anachronistic aspect of the military today is the officer-enlisted man caste system. In an age when class distinctions are muted, and when large numbers of draftees have a high school or college education, the military devotion to a class structure is puzzling. In an army there must always be those who lead and those who follow, but the gulf between officer and enlisted man goes far beyond that functional distinction. Officers are "gentlemen," entitled to an impressive list of "prerogatives." They usually have private rooms on post, the exclusive use of a variety of facilities, notably often lavish officers' clubs. Enlisted men must, under threat of court-martial, accord officers such privileges of rank as being addressed as "Sir," being treated with respect (sometimes equated with obeisance), and being obeyed. Fraternization between officers and men can be grounds for court-martial.

The 1946 Doolittle report found the caste system to be the greatest source of resentment among enlisted men, and recommended that the military be "democratized" by doing away with all but functional distinctions in rank. The recommendations were never adopted, and resentment over the petty tyrannies of rank is still a primary irritant and cause of demoralization.

Emphasis on class and rank has also had a debilitating effect upon the efficiency of NCOs and officers. The noncommissioned officer class, no longer made up solely of uneducated, working-class men, is still considered inferior to officers under the frozen structure. The resultant loss of self-esteem and the exposure to arbitrary and trivial displays of officer power inevitably affect NCO efficiency. The alcoholism among NCOs is no doubt partly attributable to this fact. Also, some of their insensitivity toward enlisted men probably comes from their own consciousness of class inferiority; they exhibit the very human need to take out aggressions upon others. Similarly, officer efficiency suffers from the unnatural emphasis upon kowtowing to superiors, and is a principal reason that many qualified men leave the service.

The military of the future will be increasingly bureaucratized, and technical skills will become ever more important. It is time for the military to adjust its personnel structure accordingly. Distinctions of rank should be abolished except on the job. Such de-emphasis might well include, in many stateside installations, dropping the requirement that uniforms be worn daily. The military, if it is to solve its personnel problems, must begin to follow the practices of successful businesses and bureaucracies; it can no longer afford the inefficiency and unnecessary resentment caused by an antiquated caste system.

Services Available to the Enlisted Man. The common soldier has consistently received the short end of the stick. Military pay raises in recent years have brought career NCO and officer salaries to acceptable levels; the basic recruit is still denied a living wage. A private E-1 gets a base pay of $134.40 per month which is inadequate, especially if he has a family or dependents, and which assumes a considerable subsidy from him in order to maintain our military strength. Therefore, pay raises,

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especially at the lower levels but also at selected levels throughout the military, are badly needed.

Other services available to enlisted men today are woefully inadequate. Psychiatric clinics at most installations are badly understaffed, though such care is needed by many recruits. Legal assistance is also insufficient, and is not available to servicemen faced with civilian litigation. Social services are not attuned to the needs and desires of most servicemen. Enlisted men's clubs are still ugly and uncomfortable; movies and sports are often the only recreations available on post. Increased emphasis upon adult education, contemporary clubs with intimate or coffee-house atmospheres, and opportunities for free political and social dialogues are needed. Few chaplains relate to young servicemen, especially to blacks and activists. Attempts should be made to provide services and facilities whereby blacks and other groups can get together, talk about their problems, bring in speakers, and establish their own identities.

Barracks life has never been pleasant; today it is indefensible. Barracks should be replaced with buildings housing no more than two servicemen to a room. They should be entitled to as much privacy as is found in college dormitories. To accomplish this, the military will have to give priority to personnel expenditures, a decision it has failed to make in the past. Since war began in Vietnam, the Department of Defense has spent hundreds of billions on weapons systems, while many servicemen still live in World War II wooden barracks.

Especially needed is an effective means for redress of grievances. The Inspector General system used in the Army, whereby an officer is appointed in each command to process complaints, has not worked well, and soldiers, especially blacks, feel that they are without effective means of relief. An "ombudsman" system, independent from the command and, in fact, from the military itself, is badly needed. Such a structure, operated perhaps by civilians under the Secretary of Defense, could provide the freedom from command domination that might permit a genuine redress of grievances.

Military Justice. Whenever the men in the ranks air grievances, the administration of military justice is at the top of the list. The system was established in its present form by the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950. It was a compromise which extended substantial due process rights to servicemen called before courts-martial, but left control over many aspects of the proceedings with individual commanders. Thus commanders have the power to bring court-martial charges against their men; to handpick the court members, counsel and other court-martial personnel from among their officers (an enlisted man may request that one-third of the court be enlisted, but he rarely does so, because he expects the commander to appoint hard-line NCOs); to carry out a variety of administrative functions concerning the trial; and then to review the conviction and sentence. No wonder that enlisted men consider military justice just an extension of the commander's disciplinary powers.

Sens. Birch Bayh and Mark Hatfield each introduced bills in the last session of Congress which would make fundamental changes in military justice. They would remove control over court-martial machinery and appointments from individual commanders and establish random selection of court members from a group broader than the commander's officers.

Reform of military justice is essential to any modernization of the military, for military justice provides the ultimate sanction by which the demands of discipline and training are enforced. Disaffection with the system cannot be dispelled in servicemen, and especially in black servicemen, until they are persuaded that military discipline and justice will give them a fair shake. □

GOVERNMENT UNDER FIRE

The Demands of Consciousness II

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By and large, Congress has been passive toward the Executive's Indochinese adventures, the majority of legislators rarely questioning White House decisions to escalate, de-escalate and re-escalate. That forbearance accords with the traditional division of labor in Washington, but Congress may now profit by taking a more active role in bringing the troops and weapons home and achieving a negotiated peace. Not only will the American economy and policy be damaged further if the war goes on much longer, but Congress' role and power are in danger if it does not attend to some new demands that are beginning to be heard from its constituents.

Public attention has been focused so extensively on the protests of the young radicals that little notice has been taken of a far larger number of older and less militant Americans who, though they inhabit Consciousness II, also want some greening. Nevertheless, I see them making four kinds of demands on the federal government in the coming years: rising standards for the performance of governmental activities, a widespread desire for more personal autonomy in everyday life, higher expectations that government do something about both, and increased willingness to put pressure on government for these purposes.

So far, rising standards have been most visible in the private sphere of life, and it is true that most people continue to want more goods and a more comfortable

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existence. In recent years, however, many have also begun to call for higher standards in public life. Quietly and without political fuss so far, they are suggesting that both government and the private economy can do better. For example, they seem less tolerant of governmental corruption and conflicts of interest; they not only seek a halt to rising crime but also less crime and better police protection than in the past. They are asking for improved schools, expect better performances in other public services, and seem less tolerant of traffic congestion. They are beginning to look askance at false advertising and shoddy consumer products; and even cleaning up the environment, which began as a campus cause, seems to have caught the public fancy. This is not to say that the citizenry is ready to demand the City Beautiful or the High Culture which reformers have long been urging on them; still, people who have achieved a relative degree of private comfort are now starting to look for more public comfort —and a stricter public morality.

They also want more autonomy in their own lives, being less willing than in the past to be bossed around by employers and held down by antiquated or arbitrary rules. In practice, this often means greater equality within the institutions that affect their lives. The clamor for equal rights, which began in the ghettos and the elite private universities, is now spreading to nonradical and nonmilitant Americans: high school students want more freedom and power in their schools; enlisted men, more democracy in army life; assembly line workers, professional athletes and journalists, more control over their work and working conditions; and women are demanding equal rights from men.

But perhaps the most important change is a declining faith in the ability of private enterprise to deal with the nation's problems and a heightened expectation that government will become the solver of last resort. The idea that it is up to government to do something about inflation and unemployment, once dismissed as Socialist agitation, is now the conventional wisdom. So are the beliefs that government should intervene in industrial disputes, force oligopolistic corporations to roll back prices, crack down on harmful ads and shoddy products, and require polluters to clean up.

More people than ever before also expect government to protect their economic well-being. The corporations have always asked for such protection, particularly against foreign competition, and during the 1960s, the poor began to demand higher welfare payments. Since then, public employees have claimed the right to strike for decent wages, blue-collar workers have demanded relief from inflation, and moderate income Americans with all kinds of collars are beginning to expect free or inexpensive college education for their children.

Other Americans are likely to bring their demands to government in the years to come. The long pent-up demand for some form of national health insurance, favored by majorities in public opinion polls for more than a generation, is now becoming insistent, and the old will soon be sufficiently numerous and politically strong to call for significantly higher Social Security payments. By the mid-1970s, when the millions of children of the post-World War II baby boom become parents themselves, they will



Greysmith, San Francisco Chronicle

"Now You've Done It!"

want good jobs, houses in which to raise *their* children, as well as all the other appurtenances to which they have become accustomed, and if private enterprise cannot supply them, they will not hesitate to turn to government. For example, when the new parents discover that the housing industry can now build for only the richest third of the population, they are likely to ask for, and get, a massive federal housing or housing subsidy program. Last year, in my own state of Massachusetts, the demand for cheaper auto insurance and the inability of the private companies to provide it forced a Republican governor to propose a state-run insurance program.

President Nixon may believe that Americans are fed up with the growth of the federal government, and perhaps they are, but when they start making demands, they do not really care which level of government, national, state or local, meets them as long as they are met. While the traditional belief that local government is superior to federal may persuade them to let the President try revenue sharing, they will be heard from again if the latest Nixonian revolution in governmental organization does not improve public services.

The fourth change is increasing political activity, a greater willingness than in earlier generations to put pressure on government. People may not always vote in large numbers, but being better educated, more sophisticated and less fatalistic than their parents, they are more likely to complain to their Congressmen, to join temporarily in organized pressure groups and citizens' lobbies, and in some cases even to demonstrate for what they want. And because they expect more from government, they will be less patient if their expectations remain unmet, and less likely to be disarmed by token programs.

The war in Vietnam did not bring about these changes in American attitudes, but it has accelerated them; war always speeds social change, and an unpopular war does so even more. (Thus it is ironic that Congressmen who think of themselves as conservatives are the most dependable supporters of the Nixon war

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olicy. As conservatives, they presumably want to slow own change, but as supporters of the war they are doing nore than all the radicals and militants put together to ccelerate it.)

Needless to say, the new demands and the political ressures they produce cannot be dealt with as long as he war continues to drain billions of dollars from the ederal coffers. But ending the war will not in itself be nough; the defense budget must also be cut back as nuch as possible, so that the funds which now go to build veapons can be spent on products and services which, nlike the products of war, create economic growth and n turn provide higher tax receipts with which the governnent can meet the new demands.

Even if the war can be ended and the war economy onverted, Congress will have its hands full. As demands nd petitioners multiply, it will be swamped with new egislation and requests for appropriations, and the pres- ure from constituents will vastly complicate the task of epresentative government—and of the representatives hemselves. But if Congress must continue for long to inance the war, serious political consequences can de- velop. If too many fund seekers compete for the small ortion of the federal budget that is left when the war nd other standing commitments are financed, those who re frustrated may turn on the government. Undoubtedly, heir dissatisfaction will be expressed first against Congress, for the voters can always punish it more quickly han they can the Executive branch. Public impatience with Congress could also produce demands for a yet stronger Executive branch, since it is popularly viewed as being able to make decisions more rapidly and firmly. This is why I said at the start that Congress is in real danger, and why it is in Congress' interest to end the war as fast as possible.

The Nixon Administration has so far been unable or unwilling to see the emerging demands for peacetime spending; instead, it has argued that anything but a victorious peace in Vietnam would so anger the hawks that their political reaction could endanger American democracy. (Conversely, the Administration has not worried about backlash from the doves, and so far its political calculations may have been justified. If American "advisers" show up in Cambodia and Laos, however, this calculation may have to be refigured, for this will quietly turn more GIs and civilian Americans against the war even if there is no vocal protest.)

However, granting the possibility of a hawkish backlash against a negotiated peace, it must not be exaggerated; politically serious expressions of such backlash would probably be limited to those parts of the country where the economy is most dependent on the war. In fact, I suspect that a large number of hawks are less interested in victory than in a greater share of the economic pie. Many suffered a decline in economic security and social position during the 1960s and believe that their lot would improve with victory. This hope is of course illusory; even if the war could be won, their discontent would soon reappear. As John Kenneth Galbraith predicted before the November elections: "If the recession continues, the hard-hats will return to the Democratic fold. . . . The boys will discover that patriotism, however admirable, is not a complete substitute for being on a payroll."

Some of the most fervent hawks are not really interested in victory in Vietnam at all. They are unhappy about recent political and cultural changes in America—especially freer sex, longer hair and pot—and look with favor on General Thieu and other foreign dictators because they would like a strong-man government at home to turn back the clock. They do not want an American dictator, at least not consciously, but they may harbor the false hope that if our government will fight to win for General Thieu or Ky, it will then also fight to prevent change in America. What people with such feelings need is not victory in Vietnam but help in coping with what is happening in America.

Finally, I foresee yet another, darker specter in America's future if the war is not ended, an even more urgent reason for peace. It is the hatred we are incurring all over the globe for the massive killing of civilians by our armed forces and by those of foreign governments who stay in power with our support. Every time U.S. bombs fall on more civilians in Indochina, every time a Latin American dictator uses American military aid to kill his opponents, America creates new enemies for itself among the survivors. The government may justify such killings as the byproducts of a war undertaken to prevent a larger war, but in reality they have the opposite effect. As they turn more people in the world against America, they increase thereby the chance for a larger war against us in the future. It is not at all inconceivable that if the killing and maiming for which we have become known all over the world continues, those who hate Americans will one day be the majority on this planet, and then all our nuclear firepower and missile superiority will not save us. □

LETTERS (*Continued from page 258*)

I also made no statement which could have been construed as stating or suggesting that if Mr. Thompson left the station before things got too rough, he might give the company, myself or anyone else "a call."

Jerome D. Gregoire, Manager
Employee & Public Relations Services
ITT Rayonier, Inc.

As we read the article, it did not carry any implications that Mr. Gregoire had been dispatched to Jacksonville to do anything legally or ethically improper, but merely to investigate reports which had been relayed to him. If the article is susceptible to any such implication it is regrettable and was not intended. In an earlier exchange of letters relating to the same article (December 28), it was stated that the FCC was "satisfied" with the version of the facts related by Mr. Gillespie. We have since been assured that this statement is incorrect. We regret the error.

—The Editors

editor's query

DEAR SIRS: With permission from Mrs. Dos Passos, I am preparing an edition of John Dos Passos' letters. I should be grateful for information from your readers about any of them. Please write to me at the Department of English, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans. 66044.

Melvin Landsberg, Assistant Professor

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Culture Strikes Back

MOVIES INTO FILM: Film Criticism 1967-1970. *By John Simon. The Dial Press. 601 pp. $8.95.*

BURTON BENDOW
Mr. Bendow is the author of a forthcoming book on the postwar Italian cinema, The Revolution Stops for Orangeade *(Grosset & Dunlap).*

John Simon's war cry, sounded here in many ways, is this: "It is not 'film culture' that the film critic, like the filmmaker, is so desperately in need of today, but just plain culture." And John Simon has it. He is a linguist, a learned man, a literary man, a drama critic—a writer whose range of vision has been enlarged and whose powers of discrimination have been sharpened by a formal, and formidable, education. Thus accoutered, he enters the movie house and the market place to do battle with the unenlightened. And he covers himself with glory.

Rival critics fall from their horses with a gratifying thud. Pauline Kael and Andrew Sarris bite the dust. The minions of commerce who award Oscars to themselves are laid low as a matter of course, as well as those who puff in the *Times* or hedge in *The New Yorker.* But Simon's chief targets are the film buffs, that is, those who are not only without culture but also against it: those who dismiss it as one of the bourgeois graces, like manners or bric-a-brac, and preserve an uncluttered and enthusiastic ignorance (Jonas Mekas); those who write anti-novels and admire "camp," which is anti-art, and who are against interpretation (Susan Sontag); those who make a cult of the meaningless (the worshippers of Godard, Simon's *bête noire*) or who pretend to find meaning in trivia (André Bazin and the holders of the *auteur* theory). Simon slays them all. And since almost everyone writing about film today is tainted by buffery if not actually rotten with it, the carnage is exhilarating. Only Dwight Macdonald and James Agee, both cultivated men as well as film critics, are praised as fellow campaigners.

These feats of arms are accomplished in the first and last chapters, which are devoted to critical matters. The rest of the book is a collection of Simon's film reviews of the past three years. Here scriptwriters, directors, actors, set designers, cameramen and composers get their just deserts. And Simon can distinguish between the weak writing of a role and the fine playing of it, as in his comments on the whorehouse madam of *Belle de Jour.* Conversely, he knows when an actress is miscast, such as the girl who plays Ursula in *Women in Love,* who is "a typical soubrette with little of the New Woman about her." And he knows why: "There is hardly any social fabric left in the film. Gone are all sorts of minor characters and social milieus that explain how the main characters live and why, ambiences into which they fit or against which they rebel." For he knows D. H. Lawrence; he has read the book. And this gives him an immense advantage over those reviewers who have not.

But a reviewer's lot is not a happy one, especially if he sets out as a cultural crusader. He has to deal with trash mostly, and deal with it briefly, and at the same time keep his readers entertained. He soon becomes fatally efficient at the game. He sharpens his invective to a scorpion sting and still cannot find relief for the injuries done him in the dark. He adopts a breezy, jazzy style—contempt is more economical than indignation—and learns to murder with a pun. He ends as a manner, not a man. When confronted with something that is not trash, and forced to abandon the manner, he becomes as a little child again and gropes his way—with unpredictable results.

Simon, who exhibits all the symptoms of this occupational disease, is somewhat at a loss when writing about films he admires, particularly when they have no literary models. His reviews of four recent works by Ingmar Bergman, Simon's hero, are largely descriptions of plot, characters and camera work, and vague sounds of approbation. If they attempt some explanation of what Bergman is up to, it is in such general terms as to explain nothing: "It is about the *condition humaine*" or "the insufficiency of life, the central hollowness." Now, these films are obscure and perplexing; *Persona* in particular cries out for interpretation. And cries out in vain. "After seeing . . . *Persona* twice, I still cannot be sure that I understand it."

These four reviews are prefaced by a commentary written later. And surely, here, free from the exigencies of reviewing, Simon should be able to stretch himself a little—to compare these late works of Bergman's with one another and with earlier films, to point out certain themes they have in common, to say what they are all about. Instead he makes this observation: "Bergman is relentlessly concerned with opposing poles within two persons, or one and the same person, or simply within human nature. For these poles he has devised the symbols *A* and *E*." Granted that the nurse and patient of *Persona* are named Alma and Elizabeth and that the two couples in *The Passion of Anna* are called Anna & Andreas and Eva & Elis, where does this lead? Does *A* represent the native Lutheran character, upright, morose, repressed, ever brooding on the difficulty of achieving truth and goodness? Does *E* stand for the product of the recent enlightenment, sophisticated, charming, devoted to pleasure and the arts, but always haunted by a sense that pleasure is evil, that its own nature is evil? Simon does not ask, much less answer, such questions. He is content to play with the alphabet.

The other reviews in this book are also grouped into chapters: "Adaptation," "Politics and Society," "The Youth Film," "Sex," "The New Violence," and so on. But these headings do not designate hard and fast categories, such as the work of one director or one school. They are mere tags assigned to arbitrary groupings. The film versions of Lawrence's novels might just as well be filed under "Sex" as under "Adaptations." Truffaut's recent efforts are stowed in "Declines and Pratfalls of Major Directors" rather than in "French Film in Eclipse." And such very different pieces as *Accident, The Midnight Cowboy* and *Lola Montes* are thrown higgledy-piggledy into a catch-all that might include three-quarters of the films discussed, "Pseudo-Art." In consequence, the essays that open each chapter rarely tell what is happening in each genre or show how films on the same subject vary in attitude and quality. They are brief affairs devoted to popular issues such as censorship or violence on the screen. In this way, Simon neglects a golden opportunity to compensate for the chief vice of the reviewer—the habit of considering a film in isolation, divorced from its social setting and historical antecedents.

The chapter headings might have been

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more useful had they indicated national origin—and this is not pedantry. Admittedly film making has become international, especially the making of superproductions. But films of any worth usually reflect the national character or deal with the national brand of misery. Had Simon grouped all the films from Italy together, he might have realized that he had witnessed—during the three-year period covered by his reviews—the tail end of the movement that began with *Open City* and *Shoeshine*. Such fierce denunciations of war and poverty gave way, a decade or so later, to *L'Avventura* and *La Dolce Vita*, which execrate the ensuing peace and prosperity. As for the present-day Italian imports, they are not merely lifeless. They are attempts to suppress or shake off the nagging of a buried humanitarian passion, which has been so long disappointed that it must at all costs be kept in the grave. They employ all the anodynes that deaden suffering. They escape to exotic climes or adopt foreign fashions *(Zabriskie Point)*. They retreat into fantasy or history or allegory *(The Damned, The Rise of Louis XIV, Teorema, Pigpen)*. Or, if they picture the current state of Italy, as the films of some younger directors do, they assume the cruel indifference of black comedy *(China Is Near)* or breathe a nostalgic sigh for a lost cause *(Before the Revolution)*.

The *Fellini Satyricon*, a product of the older generation, is set in ancient rather than modern Rome, where the horrors of *la dolce vita* are accepted without modern desperation or soul-searching. And the hero survives the most harrowing misadventures by virtue of a very necessary insensibility. Fellini himself speaks of the need for detachment from his own characters, of the danger of sympathizing with insects whose writhings imply no pain. Naturally repelled by all this, Simon compares it unfavoraby with the earlier *Le Notte di Cabiria*, which plucks at the heart-strings. He makes the comparison but, lacking any historical perspective, cannot see the connection. And, persistently bookish, he discusses the film as if it had something to do with Petronius' comic novel—it doesn't. He also assumes the manner: *"Fellini Satyricon* is barely satiric and a huge con."

The American films of the last three years, which show some stirrings of new life, are also scattered under various headings throughout Simon's book and generally misunderstood. *Bonnie and Clyde*, listed under "The New Violence," is called "puerile antihero worship." *Alice's Restaurant*, a "Youth Film," is "afflicted with a lack of attitude." Both films are the work of the same director, Arthur Penn, and share the same attitude—a celebration of the new commune, the small society formed in opposition to the great one and held together by its profound animus against the Establishment.

The old gangster movie was an inverted success story about the rise and fall of an individual. The old attack on the Establishment was a love story in which the hero, innocent but hounded by the law, clung to a heroine who was also an outcast, as proved by the upturned collar of her raincoat. Rain and loneliness were of the essence. But crime nowadays is a family enterprise beset by domestic squabbles—that is the joke in *Bonnie and Clyde*; the rest of it is a bore. And love, sexual love, is condemned as egotism or perversity—whence the purity of the heroes of *Alice's Restaurant* and *The Midnight Cowboy*, about which Simon complains. Or else love is but an extension of the new brotherhood, an intensified fellow feeling between two members of the same little clan. And, since the markedly masculine and feminine roles that figure in the old romances are rejected as shop-window poses endorsed by the Establishment, the unions in the new films are often of an unconventional kind—homosexual or interracial or triangular or defiantly illicit in some other way. Even in so trite a commodity as *The Graduate*, the young lovers illustrate the new mode. They are relatively chaste, indulge in no bedroom gymnastics, and yet they are adulterers—the film improves on the book by making their elopement take place *after* the girl's marriage to another man. The bond between them is more social (or antisocial) than sexual; they join the ranks of rebellious (though suburban) youth.

Simon is right to turn up his nose at these films. The directors, usually members of the great society possessed by a fashionable itch to be "in," are too remote from the concerns and characters of their small subjects to portray them well. Or else they conceal the squalor, the narrowness, the struggles of the small commune to withstand external pressures, because they are too eager to affirm the new brotherhood and present a united front to a hostile world. They are either commercial or sentimental—or both. The new fraternal sentiment—among beats, hippies, flower children, college students, blacks, homosexuals, what have you—will probably never find adequate artistic expression on the American screen, this country being what it is.

But Simon is no help. He has a good word only for *Medium Cool*, a failure written and directed by Haskell Wexler, who is no more than a radical journalist with a camera. The plot of the film, a romance in the old style, is a mere device to drum up interest in the photographer-hero. The important thing is what he photographs: the Negro militants and the Chicago demonstrators, who are treated in purely external fashion as the subjects of documentary reports. Let a director make one of these groups the subject of a drama, and Simon balks. For these are precisely the people who have no use for his culture, who reject it along with the great society, and who practice the film buffery he abominates. And he repays them—or the directors who idealize them—with scorn.

Simon can afford to be generous only to his allies, to those who share his culture. Bergman's last four films, though no match for *Wild Strawberries*, are treated with deference; for Bergman is "the most 'literary' and intellectual" director of the age. Truffaut, on the other hand, is "clearly not a sophisticated, discriminating, broadly intelligent person on the evidence of his last three films." Who ever thought he was? Shakespeare is naive by these standards, which are those of a course in Shakespeare. And film directors are notorious for never having matriculated. Their


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sources of inspiration are local, even parochial—the novels and plays in vogue, the current political movements, the popular entertainments, the ideas of their particular time and place. There is more variety in them than is dreamt of in Simon's culture, which he seems to regard as being all of a piece, as one culture, his. His learning is very welcome in a field where ignorance is the rule, but he wears it like armor.

Perhaps Simon is best explained as the victim of a divided society: he has had to take sides. After all, the culture that he champions is threatened. The students are rioting. The parvenu hordes are rising. And pseudo-art impudently masquerades as the real thing. The scholars and literary critics who furnished him with his superior weapons wrote books; but he has no time for that—a collection of reviews can only by courtesy be called a book. He has to rush out and unmask the impostors. And, having a low opinion of the movies, justified in most cases, he does not pause for reflection. He has the warrior's virtues, expedition and spunk. Admittedly the "film culture" that he rails against, purveyed in the little magazines, is the work of frauds and ignoramuses—it does not exist. But he fails to invent it. □

Indeterminate but Ordered

PHYSICS AND BEYOND: Encounters and Conversations. *By Werner Heisenberg. Translated from the German by Arnold J. Pomerans. Harper & Row. 247 pp. $7.95.*

MARTIN LEBOWITZ

Mr. Lebowitz has contributed to The Journal of Philosophy, The Kenyon Review *and other publications, and to two anthologies:* The Critics' Notebook *(University of Minnesota) and* The Kenyon Critics *(World).*

Werner Heisenberg, director of the Max Planck Institute for Physics and Astrophysics in Munich, tells us at the outset that his book deals with the development of atomic physics during the past fifty years, as he himself has experienced it; he says that, though science rests on experiment, its results express the interpretation of these experiments by scientists who constantly confer with one another. "Such talks form the main content of this book . . . science is rooted in conversations."

In addition, a number of these conversations concern political developments following the First World War, leading to and including the advent of Hitler, together with the postwar period when Adenauer frequently, though unsuccessfully, sought Heisenberg's endorsement of the objective of arming Germany with atomic weapons. Heisenberg repeatedly speaks of his response to the political mood of the times. He first experienced the reality of nonscientific prejudice in scientific debate in Leipzig in 1922 when he was about to enter a lecture theatre to hear Einstein speak on relativity. A youth gave him a handbill warning against Einstein and relativity, proclaiming that the theory was "wild speculation, blown up by the Jewish press and entirely alien to the German spirit." Heisenberg subsequently learned that the author of the handbill was a famous German scientist, distinguished for his experimental work, to whom Heisenberg's physics professor frequently referred. As a result, Heisenberg had serious, though temporary, doubts about the "validity" of science and the virtue of a scientific career.

A more immediate, though related, question was faced by Heisenberg some years later when Hitler came to power—the question whether or not to leave Germany and to accept a position in America. Now Heisenberg, who regarded Hitler as a personification of evil, vulgar, ignorant, and wholly at odds with Germany's best interests, was also convinced that the impending war would lead to Germany's defeat because of the incomparable superiority of its opponents' resources. In Berlin, Max Planck told him of his conversation with Hitler a few days earlier, when Planck had tried to persuade Hitler of the enormous damage done to German universities by the policy of expelling Jews. Planck spoke to Heisenberg of Hitler's derangement, a loss of contact with reality that allowed him to believe the nonsense he poured forth, indulging his delusions by ignoring everything that contradicted them. Yet Planck confirmed Heisenberg's decision to remain in Germany, arguing that he belonged to that country by birth, language and education, and that, without roots, he might simply be "leaving the field to those madmen, those spiritually unhinged creatures whose demented plans were driving Germany headlong into disaster." (Heisenberg admits at one point that the "principles of Prussian life—the subordination of individual ambition to the common cause, modesty in private life, honesty and incorruptibility, gallantry and punctuality—had always attracted [him].")

During a subsequent visit to America, Heisenberg repeated Planck's argument to Enrico Fermi, admitting that the idea of leaving Europe for America had been a temptation ever since his first visit ten years earlier. Heisenberg had a similar conversation with G. B. Pegram in New York, just before embarking for Europe; Pegram could scarcely understand Heisenberg's decision to return to a country of whose imminent defeat he was so confident.

Once the war started, Heisenberg, together with several of his colleagues, was drafted for work on the technical exploitation of atomic energy. He experienced serious misgivings, feeling that the project would be of enormous potential value in peacetime, but that, in a country at war, it was essential for scientists to be very careful lest what they do cause "untold harm." Indeed, Heisenberg was able to give the authorities an honest account of the latest technical developments, feeling certain that no attempt to construct an atom bomb would be made in Germany—"the technical effort needed to achieve what seemed a very distant goal appeared so tremendous that Hitler could not possibly have decided on it in the tense situation our country now faced." Heisenberg was given an opportunity to discuss with Niels Bohr these misgivings about working with uranium; the German Embassy in Copenhagen arranged a public lecture for him there in October 1941. Bohr was horrified by the very possibility of producing atom bombs, as well as being bitter about the brutal occupation of his country by German troops. Heisenberg speaks of the pain of seeing "how complete was the isolation to which our policy had brought us Germans, and to realize how war can cut into the most long-standing friendships." For the time being, the concept of science as a collective and international undertaking was in eclipse.

Yet the sense that science is a collective effort emerges from Heisenberg's conversations with Bohr, Planck, Paul Dirac, Wolfgang Pauli, Fermi, Erwin Schrodinger, Otto Hahn, Carl Friedrich von Weizacker, et al. Indeed, Heisenberg's association with Bohr and in particular their ability to agree on essentials such as the principle of complementarity—"The opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth"—was of incalculable importance for the development of atomic physics, having led to the principle of indeterminacy and the statistical formulation of atomic theory—concepts that earned Heisenberg the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1932. (Einstein is famous, of course, for repeatedly affirming in this connection that "God does not play dice.")

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

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An interesting feature of the so-called Golden Age of Atomic Physics was that the most prominent physicists, including Rutherford, regarded the availability of atomic energy as "moonshine." This state of innocence lasted until Otto Hahn's experiments with uranium in 1938; Heisenberg explicitly says that the possibility of constructing atom bombs never seriously occurred to anyone before Hahn's discovery.

Both the war and the rise of Hitlerism impressed Heisenberg with the weakness, rather than the strength, of German character—its irrationality—and he quotes one of his colleagues as follows:

> We Germans find it extremely difficult to think logically and soberly. We are certainly not lacking in intelligent individuals, but as a nation we are inclined to be dreamers, to prize the imagination above the intellect, to exalt emotion above reason.

Heisenberg adds:

> We Germans tend to look upon logic and the facts of nature . . . as a sort of straitjacket which we must wear, but only for lack of anything better. . . . We think that freedom lies only where we can tear this jacket off—in fantasy and dreams, in the intoxication of surrender to some sort of Utopia . . . thanks to this love of the absolute.

It is evidently with a certain satisfaction that Heisenberg writes of the events of May 4, 1945, when "Colonel Pash, leading a small U.S. detachment, came to take [me] prisoner."

Philosophically, Heisenberg starts with the Platonic assumption that ideas are prior to experience and in fact the prerequisite of experience. He tells that, early in his career, in the spring of 1919, he was deeply influenced by Plato's *Timaeus*, a philosophical discourse on the minute particles of matter. Heisenberg appears to have felt that Plato's dialogue was a speculative parable of the need of abstract mathematical forms for the interpretation of nature; atoms are not things and our experience of them can only be indirect, so that our scientific theories will themselves be a sort of parable or poetry—an attitude that tends to unite the "two cultures." In addition, Heisenberg was impressed by Einstein's view of simultaneity as dependent on the observer's state of motion. The notion that "reality" is relative to the observer became crucially important with respect to atomic particles when Heisenberg subsequently formulated the principle of indeterminacy. (The fallacy here is perhaps that of taking empiricism too seriously.)

One of Heisenberg's most interesting discussions concerns the nature of "understanding" in physics:

> "Understanding" probably means nothing more than having whatever ideas and concepts are needed to recognize that a great many different phenomena are part of a coherent whole. Our mind becomes less puzzled once we have recognized that a special, apparently confused situation is merely a special case of something wider, that as a result it can be formulated much more simply . . . the reduction of the many to the one.

The relation between this and the Pythagorean and Platonic concept of intellectual or mathematical coherence is obvious. Indeed, it is suggestive that certain logical positivists—members of the so-called Vienna circle of philosophers—expressed a somewhat analogous view of "understanding" some years later, partly, one may speculate, in response to the success of the new physics and its departure from "common sense"; the coherence theory of truth or understanding is related to idealism on the one hand and to positivism on the other. The difficulty of separating subject and object also connects modern physics with philosophical idealism.

In any event, Heisenberg points out that, beginning with Planck, an element of "number mysticism" entered atomic physics. Heisenberg describes it as a "mixture of incomprehensible mumbo jumbo and empirical success." Apparently Bohr had reached his conclusions by intuition and inspiration rather than by "rational" means, with the result that it was very difficult for him to justify his beliefs in an important lecture before Göttingen's famous school of mathematics.

Malebranche also influenced Heisenberg philosophically—the view that an essential correspondence exists between cognitive forms—human mental processes—and those of physical nature, the idea being that both are "complementary" aspects of the same phenomenon. This view may be partly responsible for Heisenberg's belief that in physics we "feel" our way to the truth. There are other "animistic" elements in Heisenberg's approach—his belief, for example, in a "formative" or "intentional" component in nature; he associates this belief both with the stability of matter and with the statistical or "indeterminate" character of atomic theory.

Toward the end of his book, Heisenberg raises questions that he is both unwilling and unable to answer; he insists that if we exclude everything unclear from our reflections, we will remain with "uninteresting and trivial tautologies." (This view is not unfamiliar, having been affirmed by Whitehead.) Heisenberg sets forth a mystical belief in "symmetry" and in a "consciousness" whose "intentions" are the structure of the physical world. In addition, he postulates a "central order" of which physics is a partial expression and with which man must live in harmony if he is to avoid horrors even worse than concentration camps and atom bombs. □

Borges Translated

THE ALEPH AND OTHER STORIES. *By Jorge Luis Borges. Translated by Norman Thomas di Giovanni. E. P. Dutton & Co. 286 pp. $7.95*

RONALD CHRIST
Mr. Christ, the author of The Narrow Act: Borges' Art of Allusion *(NYU Press), teaches English at Livingston College, Rutgers University.*

Borges' books are at last catching up to his fame and, better yet, Borges is catching up with his books. Until recently, as Alexander Coleman wrote in *Review '69*, "the figure of Borges, for better or worse," had reached "the level of a veritable literary fad." But, precisely: the *figure* of Borges. In contrast to other Latin-American writers, Gabriel García Márquez, say, to whose novel, *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, we attach the Colombian writer's name as the least meaningful way of labeling the *work*, Borges has largely been a rumor, a reputation, overwhelming any of his writings. Now, however, that situation is beginning to change because Dutton has issued the second volume in its projected series of Borges' writings; and, as they appear, these books will inevitably have a settling and solidifying effect on the prestige of Borges among English-speaking readers: these books will give weight and substance to the echo of his genius.

Not because of their bulk alone, though, but because these books come to us with an authority and a grace begotten of one of the most extraordinary literary collaborations of our time. In the past Borges has been presented by some trustworthy translators, like James Irby, and some thoroughly inappropriate ones, like Anthony Kerrigan; but now, working in daily sessions, in close collaboration with his personally chosen translator, Norman Thomas di Giovanni, in the familiar atmosphere of his native Buenos Aires, Borges is re-creating his

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own work in English. In other words, he books in this series are not merely ranslations but original texts, different rom the previous Spanish ones, but ully their equal in sanction, dignity and ntention; these books are the product, or the most part, not of the double Borges we know from his famous autoiographical piece, *"Borges y yo"* but he achievement of three minds: the Borges who wrote the Spanish text in he past, the Borges, fully conversant vith English and in love with its "verbal nusic," who collaborates in the rehinking of "every sentence in English vords," and the di Giovanni, nominal ranslator, who along with Borges has 'shunned the dictionary as much as ossible" and cooperated in making 'these stories read as though they had een written in English." This method, is the co-workers say, may be new, and f the description sounds like something rom Borges' fiction that's good, because he scheme he has discovered for rendering his work into English is thoroughly Borgesian, even down to the preface to his present volume which he and di Giovanni conclude with both their initials ut commence with a sentence insinuated round shifting pronouns: "Since *my* ame rests on *my* short stories, it is nly natural that *we* should want to include a selection of them among the several volumes of *my* writings *we* are translating for E. P. Dutton." (Emphasis added.) The aesthetic, psychological and critical implications of those pronouns are dizzying, and, of course playful: pure Borges; and they do compress a persistent theme in the man's work—meaninglessness of self—as they support his statement in the charming "Autobiographical Essay" (written directly in English with di Giovanni) that collaboration requires "a joint abandoning of the ego, of vanity, and maybe of common politeness."

The occasion of this volume, then—this review too—and its "chief justification," as the preface knowingly states, "is the translation itself": after all, the main stories in the collection have long been available in other translations, and this translation is definitive, superseding all others, which in the future can only exist as more or less perceptive commentaries on it. The simple ease, the quiet truth of this prose as it embodies intuitions and perceptions both subtle and inevitable will win new readers to Borges immediately and recall old ones. Among the latter, of course, there will be some who demur: "Borges and Myself" is now preferred to the better known "Borges and I" and the much annotated "unanimous night" from "The Circular Ruins" is replaced by "encompassing night," perhaps in keeping with the principle of Borges' later style which prohibits any word from erupting out of the context. But readers, old or new, who take time to compare specific passages, the opening sentence from "Borges and Myself," for example ("It's to the other man, to Borges, that things happen"), with other translations ("The other one, the one called Borges, is the one things happen to." or "Things happen to him, the other one, to Borges") will find that the present version is far better English and much more suitable to the deceptively unassuming, patiently lucid, untiringly calm and gentle tone which *is* Borges —the Borges you hear in your head long after the "methodically strange" stories have become familiar. Naturally the question of this version's faithfulness to the original, to Borges' own original, will occupy scholars and students for some time—dissertations on the subject are as good as written—but the superior English of this translation will serve its highest end in pleasing readers.

On the other hand, the ultimate occasion of this collection is not the translation at all but the reintroduction into English of nine important narratives and the introduction of eleven lesser works,

NONPERSON

If dead
they need only transport his worms
or change the name of a street.

Alive he is a dilemma
undone by declaring him extinct,
as the pterodactyl
sank on leather wings.

If memory persist in a man,
if you consort in the head
with a nonperson,
you can be wrapped in wet sheets
in a hospital room until you recover.

The face you see
in the photograph
they say is illusion
thrown on the screen of events —
it can be reversed.

He walks in the avenues of night;
the dog and the passerby
know he has a shadow.

The state that abolished him
exists only in the mind:
when he finds the others
they announce the nonstate,
the first commune.

Don Gordon

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along with fascinating commentaries and an autobiographical sketch by the man who is certainly the most important writer of short fiction today. On this pretext alone the volume stands justified. Here are some of the Argentine's great fictions, all heresies from conventional literary reality, coupled with little known works dating from his earliest period of storytelling right up to 1969. *The Aleph and Other Stories* therefore serves both as a confirmation of Borges' special genius—evidenced in the first and title story about a point in space (underneath a flight of cellar stairs in Buenos Aires) that contains all other points in space—and a brief history of his development—embodied in the succeeding stories. These are arranged in chronological order: the stagey "Streetcorner Man," written in 1933 and telling about the virtually motiveless knifing of a hoodlum in the slums of Buenos Aires; "The Approach to al-Mu'tasim," published in 1935 as a review of a nonexistent detective novel but so true in its fiction that it caused one friend of Borges to order the fake book from England; on to the metaphysical stories of "patterns in time and space" from his great period in the '40s and early '50s; and finally a spare narration called "Rosendo's Tale," published in 1969 as the retelling of "Streetcorner Man" from an opposing point of view. The full cycle of Borges' narrative art is exhibited—emerging from a colorful tale of Buenos Aires low life ("Streetcorner Man") into the dazzling fantasies of a cosmopolitan mind weaving marvels of logic and erudition on a loom of fable and detective story ("The Circular Ruins," "Death and the Compass"), and then returning to "straightforward storytelling" of incidents from the turn of the century in Argentina ("The Intruder," "Pedro Salvadores"), but this time without "working in metaphors or details of local color." Other anthologies have included segments of the major arc in this cycle, but in furnishing those early and late tales which have never appeared in English in book form before—in furnishing *all* these stories in a translation of such quality and sovereignty—*The Aleph and Other Stories* offers a perspective for the stories on which Borges knows his fame rests, and is accordingly the most useful introduction in English to Borges' fiction.

Which is not to say that the best of Borges is gathered in this selection, despite the dust jacket's blurb: "The most important stories by one of the half-dozen giants of contemporary literature." Any number of Borges' best stories like "The Zahir," which centers on an object that obliterates all other objects and is consequently the fitting pole to the Aleph, or "The Immortal," Borges' most ambitious story, are missing, not because the collaborators thought it best to omit them but because legal rights to make new translations of these works were denied them. So what might ordinarily be an ugly though petty legal question looms as an interference with art itself. The artist is denied the right to work with his materials—in this case, his own words—by the miserable self-interest of property holders. Yet, just as the impact of *The Aleph and Other Stories* as translation will eventually wear off, leaving the book's independent literary merit as exclusive justification for its existence, so other translators and publishers must eventually relinquish their grip—must be made to—so that Borges can complete the business and art of catching up with his own books in English. In the meantime, it is good to know that he is continuing his unique collaboration against the day when all personal claim to his fiction will have dissipated into the nothingness of the ego he has often imagined, and his greatness in this country will be owing to the reading of his words, in English, as he himself thought and wrote them. □

FILMS

ROBERT HATCH

The series that Truffaut has been tailoring to the ingratiating talents of Jean-Pierre Léaud, of which the current chapter is *Bed and Board,* has run disastrously thin. For perhaps half its length, the new film shows no narrative flow at all, occupying itself with stock incidents of young married life and vignettes of Parisian folk charm at the level of Sunday travel supplement enticements. And when plot does appear, in the person of a remarkably tall Japanese girl (Hiroko), whose deplorable impassivity is alleged to be a splendid jest, it runs turgid with trivial predictability.

I am reluctant to attribute bad intentions to any director, and it may be that Truffaut sees these salad-year cartoons of his as adding up to a substantial record of evolution into manhood. From outside, however, the project begins to look cynical, another venture at packaging the celebrated *esprit français* for export. It is likely that Truffaut now makes the bulk of his income in America, a balance of trade known to be hazardous for couture, champagne and artists. In any case, he seems to be turning Léaud into a recipe for the American taste: a bit of good little boy, rathe more of petulant youth; the celebrate blank stare when caught off guard, th electric sparks of emotional energy, th admirably graceful body in undisci plined motion. It requires almost n motivation to set this routine into mc tion, and that is the degree of motivatio it gets. Opposite Truffaut's alleged alte ego is Claude Jade, whose portrayal c sexy domesticity so lacks subtlety an nuance that I hope, for the future o her career, it embarrasses her.

It is true, of course, that the worka day manners of the French are consider ably more codified and stylized tha those of the Americans—who in fac have almost none—and a local aud ence may decide that some of the cul tivation routinely demonstrated in *Be and Board* has polished its deportmen But any French film of bourgeois lif performs that service, and most of ther come equipped also with some discern ble dramatic intention.

Ramparts of Clay, directed b Jean-Louis Bertucelli with a cast draw almost entirely from the tiny Tunisia village it describes, is being compared inevitably, to the works of Flaherty. I profits, as do his films, from the pure direct beauty that absolute poverty be stows on men and women, their shelter and their tools. But this time an openin quotation from Frantz Fanon, assertin that a bitter waste of time and live occurs when a newly liberated societ sets bourgeois aspirations for itself, ma at least check the tendency of a bour geois audience to practice its aesthetic on famine as a style. Also, social justic aside, it is now becoming a common place that the Arabs are superb natura architects, and the village that Bertucell has chosen to photograph is a work o fascinating organic sculpture, created suppose with as little artistic considera tion as were the hellishly carved sal mountains that rise behind it.

The picture is said to be taken fron a novel, and wisps of story float through it. Thus the village activity assumes a point of view from the discontent of a beautiful girl, I believe an actress, whc is not native to the the place and whc is driven at the end to drown hersel in the desert. A man to whom she i perhaps drawn and who mines slab of salt from the precipitous slopes o the nearby hills is known to be los when his horse returns alone. Comrade search, but he is not found.

And, carrying out Fanon's observa tion, the men of the village, whose live lihood is to supply broken rock fo some remote, unspecified project, rebe when they are too far exploited. They

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sit down on their rock pile, and the militia is called to keep them there, away from food and water. By a ruse, the siege is lifted after a day or two, but the conflict is never resolved or placed in any substantial context.

And it is true of all the narrative fragments that they are not related to one another or to any unifying notion. These inconclusive bits of storytelling work against the documentary strength of the picture, puzzling the audience and making it restive. The way, I think, to get the most from this deeply felt and beautifully recorded account of a dozen or so families scratching survival out of the desert with their bare hands is to take it as immediate communication, and to resist the narrative leads. I doubt that it will be on the feature circuit very long for you to take it in any way, but it will be showing up on film society programs for years to come. □

THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

John Guare's most striking talent is for savage farce. There are scenes in Act II of his first full-length play, *The House of Blue Leaves* (Truck and Warehouse Theatre), in which his fancy boils over into a tempest of hilarity. They are the best things in the play; they provoke wild laughter and merit enthusiastic applause. Still, the play remains unfulfilled; the reasons are worth careful attention.

Guare is not simply a prankster. What motivates him is scorn for the fraudulence of our way of life. In *The House of Blue Leaves* he has been aroused by the obsession with big shots, "personalities," stars, the "in" tribe. That is a way of saying that we no longer see people as human beings; we worship "names." The imbecile, the villainous, the irredeemably mediocre possess glamour (even when we profess to despise them) if they have been sufficiently publicized. No wonder advertisement is the country's prime industry.

The central figure of *The House of Blue Leaves,* Artie Shaughnessy, a man who tends the animals in a zoo, has wanted all his life to be a pop songwriter. His tunes are atrocious. He is not only ungifted—which is no great matter—he is a fool. He is abject in the fetishism of his fellow citizens. The only people who count for him are those who have "made good"; everyone from his wartime buddy who has become a successful Hollywood director to the Pope. His son Ronnie, he boasts, will rise to glory in the Army into which he has recently been drafted. His girl friend, whom he intends to marry when he gets his divorce, is a frisky goose who encourages his idiotic delusions of grandeur. She is a girl who knows everything about the personages celebrated in the gossip columns, television, movie magazines.

Artie really knows nothing about himself or anyone else. His son loathes the Army, goes AWOL—and plans to blow up the Pope on his visit to the U.N. Artie's girl friend leaves him when he proves a bust. His stupidity is apparently the cause of his wife's insanity, though she too is infected with the craving for the smile of the blessed public heroes. Toward the end of the play the Hollywood director—a person of no consequence except there—assures Artie that he is the man for whom all his pictures have been made. Artie stands for the half-wits who constitute the bulk of the audience for Hollywood's typical product.

There is a certain grimness in all this but Guare turns it into a roar of clownish mockery. *The House of Blue Leaves* is crazy fun. But something disturbs it. That "something" may be (this is only conjecture) a personal pain—an autobiographical memory?—which causes Guare to inject elements of cruel sorrow into the proceedings. There is nothing at all mirthful about the madness of Artie's wife nor in the play's final moment when he strangles her.

The play suffers, thus, from a discrepancy of style, but that need not have been fatal. What damages the total effect is that nobody—not the director, the producers, nor apparently the author himself—appears to have been aware of what was required to make the play a workable whole for the stage. It is true that the text itself is deficient in inner coherence, but with some revision and with more knowledgeable direction the flaw might have been overcome. I have just now suggested that Artie's obtuseness may have caused his wife's insanity, but that connection is not made in the writing. As the play stands, she is an unexplained hospital case: a raw wound that cripples the play's comic nature. Insanity, violence, death itself can be—has often been given—a comic, even a farcical mask in the theatre and every other art form.

The play calls for natural comedians. William Atherton as Artie's son, with close-cropped hair, malicious grin and taut nerves—an image of the wild ones of the younger generation—is properly cast. Margaret Linn, as a pretty, innocently earnest and totally deaf movie starlet, is comic without strain. The same may be said of Alix Elias as a little nun—an endearingly cute character.

The "principals" are far less fortunate, both from miscasting and from a stylistic misconception that mars the whole production. Harold Gould, who plays Artie, is a proficient and intelligent actor: he strikes one as an educated man of the middle class, a carefully groomed professor. But Artie is at best a pathetic "schmo," a well-meaning slob. He should be projected sincerely *as a joke.* Instead, Artie is played dramatically; thus his scenes with his wife are so chilling that at times he

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FAT CAT

Outside the window of my Cadillac
I see a village burn. The stereo
Drums out the shots, brings back
Memories of Las Vegas, sweet shad roe,
You, your breasts, nestled at the slot machine.

Here the dead are stacked about my car
Like chips; a helicopter spins, a monster
Roulette wheel. My auto bar
Holds iced martinis, liederkranz, and caviar.
Outside night now turns dark as gangrene.

I'll flip the windshield wipers on because
The sky is spewing cubes of fire like dice.
Let's play strip poker to the butt.
Bottoms up. Your bare body's very nice.
These foreign girls spread gonorrhea and lice.

What if at home they riot down New York!
Your eyes are silver dollars, your flesh sable.
With luck, my inflationary jewel,
You will still be my bottle, I your cork,
Champagne, in the back of my black Cadillac.

Robert Watson

appears to be as psychopathic as she.

Artie could be made oddly laughable, if played by an actor in whom a zany naïveté, shrewdness of observation and a bouncing imagination are mingled. Gould is not such an actor. Nor does Katherine Helmond, whose forte is pathos, contribute anything but shock to the role of Artie's wife. The combination of these two players produces the effect of a "psychological" drama. The comedienne Anne Meara, in the role of the dizzy dame whom Artie proposes to marry, is so forced through miscalculated direction that she fails to get the laughs inherent in the part, laughs which should normally come easily to her.

While *The House of Blue Leaves* possesses real and valid content, it cannot, given Guare's gifts, be articulated as realism. Even the setting betrays it. The background for such a play demands some manner of humorous stylization. What one sees instead is a literal replica of a grubby apartment in Sunnyside, Queens. And why, even for "realism," must a set be so detailed in architecture and utilities? The cost of such a set, under present conditions, must exceed a sensible budget for Off-Broadway. Plays of this kind are more readily enjoyed when unburdened by the needless (and inartistic) ponderousness of the scenic trappings which most managers associate with first-class production.

Long ago I came to the conclusion that within the disastrous economics of show business there lies a more destructive factor: the lack of basic theatre understanding.

I cannot tell what Robert Montgomery's *Subject to Fits* (Public Theatre) will mean to anyone unacquainted with Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*. The author of this little "experimental" play disclaims any intention of dramatizing that great novel. He calls his piece a "response" to it. In a way it is more revealing than most of the screen or stage versions of the book, which though overwhelmingly dramatic does not lend itself to convincing transference to either of these media.

Montgomery translates the Dostoevsky narrative into the the verbal and stage language of the young theatre today. He has made it "absurd" without derisive bias. He reduces complex episodes to momentary flashes, he traces personages in summary strokes, he uses a mini-constructivist stage as well as semi-symbolic props, he introduces songs and there is even a suggested caricature of an operatic quartet.

With all this one cannot escape the impression that Montgomery, after his own fashion, has really felt Dostoevsky. The acting and direction are integral to the provocative quality of the evening's event. The result is immature, ragged and yet somehow endowed with a spark of true sensibility. One hopes that after this exercise (and another similar treatment of Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*, which the Public Theatre plans to produce) Montgomery will turn to more direct statements of his own. □

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1383

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Does an eagle reputedly have charge of things? (11)
9 and 7 down It might be an imposition on one reindeer of Santa's, but she could show you the hall steps. (4,6)
10 Sam or Vanya, for example. (5)
11 See 14 down.
12 Can the boys come back around it—like Teapot Dome? (7)
13 Begin about 51, and get shown up by such as Algol. (7)
15 A bad tear gets most big, it seems. (8)
16 See 4 down.
18 and 28 across Not a cardiac recording—though it might measure the financial heartbeat of the nation. (6,4)
21 Communist foil? (Might be present in disaster.) (3,5)
24 Old money has a couple of signs of the orient about it to develop the faculties. (7)
26 Typified more by Boz than by Parker? (3,4)
28 See 18 across.
29 A ray of light right opposite the middle? (5)
30 Customs puts something into service. (4)
31 You might get a charge out of being so placed. (5,6)

DOWN

2 Northern resources that beat the Confederacy? (British standard, obviously.) (5,4)
3 24 — 600 + 1050 = what? (At least copy the answer!) (7)
4 and 16 across University official has a bad habit, getting concerned with the common man. (4,6)
5 Like the unheard melodies of Keats. (7)
6 If you're this wise, you're probably different. (5)
7 See 9 across.
8 It takes a pound just to get a particle of it in England, poetically. (6)
14 and 11 across Where the damned actor is likely to go? (Very light, perhaps.) (4,5)
17 Reaming us out of flowers? (9)
19 and 23 Does one have to be brave to put two and two together in such an unseasonable time? (6,6)
20 Go over the steps again and soak the entire people! (7)
22 Martin Luther King, self-proclaimed. (7)
23 See 19 down.
25 How those who have admissions might come. (5)
27 One of Lyra's 14. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1382

ACROSS: 1 Throwback; 6 Prism; 9 Alcalde; 10 Pretend; 12 Ethics; 15 Fastness; 16 Budget; 18 Unrest; 20 Antonius; 23 Felt; 24 Gaffer; 25 and 11 Firkin; 28 Untruth; 29 Entreat; 30 Hides; 31 Dedicated. DOWN: 1, 17 and 13 Track and field meet; 2 Recants; 3 Wilderness; 4 Amethyst; 5 Kopeck; 6 Peel; 7 Iceberg; 8 Meditates; 14 Autocratic, 15 Four-flush; 19 Related; 21 Inflect; 22 Bathed; 26 Rated; 27 Fuss.

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

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